This is a continuation in a series of posts that essentially act as a long-form answer to the thread from a few weeks ago "What is America's Role in the World?" The subject of this thread is Russia's interest in Ukraine (why they bothered to annex Crimea) and its broader long-term interests in Europe.

Edit: give me a few minutes to fix the images....

Let's start with a timeline map of the USSR (the gif won't load, the map below will have to do)

If you were to form a country in a hostile world, you'd look for certain attributes in chunk of land: natural resources, defensible borders, and interior transport (rivers). For defensible borders, oceans are best and mountains and harsh desserts are reasonable substitutes. Wide open plains suck and, if that's your only option, then your best defensive strategy is to put significant buffers between your core population centers and possible aggressors. This is the reality of the Russian people: long land borders, flat lands, and few geographic barriers.

If you look at a population density map of Russia, the core territory is in the western fifth of the country and this is largely driven by the fact that this is the only land suitable for agriculture and the location of Russia's only navigable river and thus nearly all of Russia's industrial capacity. The problem here is that Russia sits on the eastern front of the Northern European Plain, a chunk of land that's easy to move an army across (which has happened a couple of times).

In the pre-nuclear age, Russia's borders could rightfully be considered a problem and even a chief concern for the Russian government. What to do? Option number one is to build an enormous army. Alas, prior to WW2, Russia didn't generate sufficient agricultural or other surpluses to afford a standing, professional army so it had to make-do with conscripts with the upshot being that Russia could marshal quite a few conscripts if the need arose. Option number two is to have significant buffers between your core population centers and potential aggressors. This was the core rational of the Soviet Union: protect the Russian core and maybe get some economies of scale with it. The Soviet Union really got started almost 100 years prior to its formal founding in the aftermath of Napoleon's invasion of Russia (which came just 100 years after Charles XII invasion of Russia). The idea was to use annexed/allied (whatever you want to call them) nations as a buffer to Russia's core territory.

The century from ~1920 to present has history well known to all of us: the USSR was formed with a bunch of Eastern European countries with distinct ethnicities, cultures, and national identities became buffer states for Russia. These same states were first steamrolled by Germany and then again by Russia, and then reincorporated into the USSR as a buffer post WW2. After the end of the Cold War, they broke away and regained their national sovereignty.

The idea of anyone invading Russia today seems laughable to an outsider but you have to remember a few things:

1. Traumatic events tend to stick in the national memory and identity for a long, long time and being invaded once a century for three centuries rightfully instilled paranoia in the Russian national mindset. Russian leadership views NATO encroachment on its Western borders in a similar light to Hitler, Napoleon, and Charles XII.
2. In a similar vein, political preferences tend to follow cultural momentum. Russia has had some rough times historically and the Russian people have often gravitated toward "strong men" as leaders as a result.
3. In times of despair, nations often reach into the past to search for a former glory. For the Russian people, a reasonable argument that a high-point of national pride in the last century was the Red Army flying their flag over the Reichstag. Let's just call that a military victory for the time being.
4. Leaders such as Putin are keenly aware that foreign wars are a convenient distraction from domestic problems (this is a saying that dates back to the Roman Empire, and it likely goes back even farther than that)

Let's now turn to that domestic problem.


The images above are population pyramids. Things to note are the low life expectancy of men, the significant baby bust after the collapse of the Soviet Union (shown by the small population cohorts of those under the age of 30), and, looking forward to 2030, the dearth of men between the ages of 20 and 40. This number will only total ~13,000,000. Consider that now it totals ~20,000,000. Beyond just being an important part of any nation's labor force, males in this age group have, historically, been prime candidates for military service. Consider that you need someone at home to keep the lights on and you can see why such a demographic decline would be existential to a military.

For reference, below I've included population pyramids of the United States and India



One thing to keep in mind is that the previously referenced Russian demographic data actually shows an optimistic picture. The Russians first figured out that they had a problem in the early 2000s and, since then, they've periodically revised and massaged previously released population data. But to make things even worse, a good chunk of people living within Russia are ethnic Turks and the ratio of ethnic turks to ethnic Russians is actually increasing, said Turks primarily reside in Oblasts that border Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Russian leadership views this as a problem (read: secession risk).

At this point, a lot of people might say "so what?" and, indeed, it doesn't appear that I've made a compelling argument for any sort of Russian military aggression. However, I don't have to. Russia already tipped its hand in two ways: by annexing Crimea and building a gas pipelines directly to Germany with more capacity than makes sense. Also consider that if Russia is ever going to launch a ground offensive in any theater to accomplish any national goal... whatever that may be... it clearly has a narrow window to do so... and Russia's leadership is not ignorant of this fact.

Let's focus on those gas pipelines for a minute: that's $40billion of pipelines of middling economic value. The Russian position for both Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 is that they will "further supply one of Russia's principle customers of natural gas" but most of us should know better than to take Russia's statements at face value. An obvious "business" problem with Russia's overland gas network is that if you want to sell to Germany you must also transit gas through Poland and other Eastern European countries. Thus if you want to sell gas to Germany for $X you have to make a deal with Poland to sell them gas for $Y. The Nord Stream pipelines solve this "business" problem by allowing Russia to supply major countries separately.

If you analyze Russian gas exports to Europe as a whole and look at the principle pre-Nordstream pipelines, the Yamal and the Soyuz/Brotherhood, some interesting things come to light. First, both the Yamal and the Soyuz adequately supplied Europe especially considering that optimistic forecasts of European gas consumption indicate stagnation. Second, before the Nord Stream Pipelines, if Russia were to have cut its natural gas supply off to Ukraine (via the Soyuz/Brotherhood) it would not be able to supply the rest of Europe via the Yamal alone. If Russia ever wished to retake Ukraine it had to have a way of supplying Europe so that the Europeans could observe the conflict in relative comfort rather than actually being directly affected by having their gas cut off. (I'll come back tomorrow and post charts of pipeline capacities and European demand).

What does Russia gain by taking over the Ukraine? For one, it gains a bit of a geographic anchor. The Carpathian mountains stretch through northeast Romania, part of Ukraine, and into southeastern Poland. The Carpathians, in conjunction with the Black Sea, would fortify Russia's southwestern border. Russia would also gain control over ~35 Soviet-era (though many since upgraded) arms factories, significant wheat and grain production, and, if done... creatively... ~45,000,000 additional warm bodies. The grain side is not trivial as a combined Russia-Ukraine would effectively become a global wheat juggernaut.

Russia could likely extend these gains significantly in Belarus, a country which has a significant organic pro-Russian domestic movement, very significant economic ties, and, frankly, friendly relations. The recent withdrawal of the U.S. from the INF treaty will likely be an excuse for Russia to ask Belarus for permission to deploy troops and a missile defense battery within its territory (more on this later as the Russians were the first ones to break the INF treaty and really forced the hand of the U.S, I put this in bold purposely so that in a few months the people reading this will say "gee, good call, maybe this isn't crazy....").

Extend this trend and it's not much of a stretch to consider Russia invading and taking over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to consolidate their western border and increasing their geographic buffer between the core Russian territory and perceived threats to the west. In my opinion, Russia's western conquest will end here. Why? It could accomplish all of this with shocking ease and minimal bloodshed.

In the case of Belarus, getting troops onto Belarusian territory might take as little as a friendly "please, thank you" from Putin and once troops have a semi-permanent presence on Belarusian territory and they're present for a while without wrecking the place the organic domestic pro-Russian movement will likely gain steam and Belarus will likely become an Oblast with little changing in the day to day life a Belarusian. In Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, Russia will probably try a mixture of political propaganda and hybrid warfare. Taking the rest of Ukraine will probably require more outright warfare but that won't take place until Russia has seeded some significant political divides within the country. Said overt military action will require cutting the gas at some point, hence my prior reference to Nord Stream.

At this point, let's take a step back and consider something: Russia's leadership is smart. They play chess. They play the long game (even if their preferred style of governance undermines them in the long run). To take a small detour, if we consider Putin's passion for Judo, it makes sense that part of his strategic style is to use his opponent's force against them. In light of that, let's look at the dissolution of the INF Treaty.

According to recent public revelations, Russia started developing the SSC-8 GLCM back in 2005. There's not a ton of information in the public domain about this missile but speculation is that it has a range of ~2,500km and can carry a warhead of ~450kg (enough to carry a small thermonuclear warhead). In terms of capability, it's not entirely clear what point of the missile is. In the 60s or 70s it would have been something to sweat but it lacks terrain following, stealth, or even speed which means there's a chance modern air defense systems could shoot it down. That doesn't mean it doesn't pose a threat but it also doesn't make sense given Russia's limited R&D budget and long-running development of hypersonic missiles which would present a true advantage as a first strike weapon. Again, development of the SSC-8 started back in 2005. An odd time to develop such a missile.

What's also odd is that the Obama administration (supposedly) approached Russia several times in 2008 and 2009 to "discuss" the missile in private but the Russian government rebuffed the administration and refused to acknowledge the weapon's existance. Again, an odd behavior especially given that back channels and private conversations about weapon development and deployment had become a norm after the partial nuclear test ban treaty in the early 1960s.

In 2010, NATO announced the deployment of the Aegis Ashore system would begin in Romania starting around 2015. Russia stated that this deployment violated the treaty but this is, on its face, farcical, as the fielded SM-3 does not have the throw weight (the warhead it carries is in the 50kg range and if you up the warhead weight you reduce the range drastically) or body diameter to house a thermonuclear warhead.

Meanwhile, from what we can gather in the public, Russia began to manufacture the SSC-8 though they have not been deployed. Still, this rightfully makes a number of European military minds uncomfortable and thus pressure emerged for the U.S. to deploy additional missile defense batteries, declare the INF deal dead, and possibly develop a counterbalancing weapon.

...and with that, Putin got exactly what he wanted. An excuse to stage troops and missile defense systems in Belarus to counter "American aggression."

But we're not done. In my opinion Belarus will be an easy take for Russia but it can't roll on Ukraine until another precondition is met. Outside of Russia's own machinations, many stars have aligned for Russia. Europe is bogged down with "domestic" infighting, its military capabilities have deeply languished, and pacificism is omnipresent. Further, China has risen as a very serious distraction for the U.S which is itself bogged down with domestic issues (insert something about Russian meddling here). The Russians are probably pretty confident that the Germans won't run to arms so long as they have their natural gas and Russia's push west is relatively bloodless (except in the Ukraine). However, they probably aren't that confident that the Americans will be so passive so they'll probably want to make sure that America is bogged down somewhere else: Iran.

Iran's relationship with Russia is a curious one. Even though Iran has appealed to Russia for "help" in countering the U.S, Russia has only paid lip service to the notion. Earlier this year, Iran actually asked Russia to purchase an S-400 missile defense system but Russia rebuffed Iran:
https://www.bloomberg.com/...st-amid-gulf-tension
...which is a strange move given that Russia had just sold Turkey, theoretically a NATO member, an S-400 missile defense system. Given that Iran would be a perfect theater, in theory, to show off the S-400's ability to defend against or deter American air power, Russia's move is a strange one but not if you consider that Russia actually wants America to go to war with Iran.

Consider also that Russia has decided to stab Iran in the back financially and thus further box it in economically with its recent maneuvers in the Caspian and investment (or lack thereof) in Iran's oil fields: https://oilprice.com/...Of-32-Trillion.html# (I strongly suggest reading this in its entirety)


Within this context, it's only a matter of time before Iran lashes out and draws America's ire. Don't be surprised if Russia throws some kindling into the flames.

And with all of that, I've been typing for nearly two hours and I've run out of steam with an unsatisfactory conclusion as always. I'll close with this: Russia's annexation of Crimea was a test with the idea being to probe a western response (they basically got none) and then sit quietly for a time. Phase two will be to stage troops etc. in Belarus and this was set in motion well over decade ago. This, again, will probe the western response which in all likelihood will be none. If that goes well, expect Russia to wait for or create a distraction and then launch its mixture of hybrid warfare in Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This is all speculation on my part but the puzzle pieces fit together nicely in my opinion.