It's just an analogy, and I'm certainly not comparing women to agricultural crops. The point is that when we value things for some particular attribute, we also value those things that will develop that attribute as highly- or if not exactly as highly, very, very closely. It would seem unreasonable and weird not to, to be honest. The only time it really seems to happen is with the unborn.

As for balancing that value against the health of the mother . . . That's another, subsequent question. How you make that determination depends very largely on how much value you assign to the unborn prior to personhood. If you believe as you do, that it doesn't merit value until it actually develops personhood (or the physical capacity for it) then that determination is a really simple question. If, on the other hand, you believe as I do that pre-persons are as valuable, or close to as valuable, as persons, it's not so simple. You might reasonably decide that abortion is acceptable to save the life of the mother, but probably not for much else.

I also think it's a little misleading to center the discussion about abortion around threats to the mother's life. There are millions of abortions carried out every year. The CDC says there are around 600 pregnancy related deaths annually. The vast, vast majority of abortions are not carried out to save the life of the mother, or even because the pregnancy puts the mother at risk.

I don't think I track with your conflation of the illegal immigration issue. I don't say that illegal immigrants aren't people. I say they're not citizens, and have no right to be in this country. Nor do I think they don't enjoy human rights or shouldn't enjoy the protection of law that extends to all people in this country. Pretty sure you haven't heard me arguing that it should be legal to shoot them on sight.

My neighbor is a person, too, but I don't think he has a right to walk through my door and help himself to a beer from my fridge.

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"People think it must be fun to be a super genius, but they don't realize how hard it is to put up with all the idiots in the world."

Yeah, I know. I thought made for good dramatic effect though, reminding the resident social conservative that women are, in fact, human beings.


This is why all analogies fail in these discussions, and really, they're unnecessary in the first place. There's nothing even remotely analogous, and it (what you describe) happens with the unborn because of their inextricable link to, and impact on, the host. Nothing else is comparable, so it's not surprising that it only happens in this context.


I don't think I've argued that it doesn't merit value, just that the value depends on context, including but not exclusively stage of development, prior to the capacity for Personhood.

Nothing about this is simple.


Of course not, because abortion is legal. But there's more to those numbers, obviously, and they vary wildly from one region to another in the developing world. As for deaths, yes, they are relatively rare. In fact, the 50+ obstetric surgeon revealed that it was his first maternal death he's ever experienced. But we routinely have patients that are admitted with pregnancy induced hypertension, pre-eclampsia, eclampsia, renal failure, etc. These conditions have physical and financial consequences, measurable and unmeasurable, and they are borne largely, and in some cases entirely by the woman. In third world countries affected by the Global Gag Rule, these consequences can be absolutely devastating to women and their families. So while I'm not centering the discussion on threats to the mother's life, there are very real health, well being, and financial consequences, to varying degrees, involved in every pregnancy. And some women simply can't afford that risk, particularly if they have a history that puts them at what they consider an unacceptably high risk. A morning after pill for a rape victim of advanced (potential) maternal age with a history of ecclampsia could be life saving. It could be marriage saving. It could be job and home saving. These are the considerations that, pre-Personhood, should be left entirely to the woman in choosing whether or not to allow pregnancy, or induce menstruation. That's not to say that the fertilized ovum not yet implanted has no value, only that value doesn't weigh as heavy as it would after pregnancy is established.


It wasn't conflation, it was an analogy. I'm saying we agree that they're persons, just like us, but you don't believe they should have the same legal benefits and protections as United States citizens (nor do I, to be clear), because they haven't obtained that status, just as the non-Person, in my view, while human, hasn't obtained the status of Person and is therefore not fully legally protected by law as it's own entity, independent of the host. But as I said earlier, no analogies are particularly useful here, nor are they necessary. We both understand each other's position and reasoning quite clearly, I think.

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The devil made me do it the first time, second time I done it on my own - W

I thought made for good dramatic effect though, reminding the resident social conservative that women are, in fact, human beings.

Yep. And half of those aborted human beings would one day be women. Significantly more than half in some places.

Probably neither of us really needed to be reminded of those facts.

There's nothing even remotely analogous, and it (what you describe) happens with the unborn because of their inextricable link to, and impact on, the host. Nothing else is comparable, so it's not surprising that it only happens in this context.

I think your reasoning here is flawed.

There is no dispute about the link between the unborn and the mother, or the impact on one or the other. That's not at issue. The issue is how much if any value to assign to the unborn. On one side of the scale is the significant and weighty matter of the impact to the mother. The question is how heavy or light the other side of that scale is- does the unborn, pre-person have its own moral heft, or is it simply not valuable at all until it attains personhood? Because once it does, that doesn't lessen the link between it and the mother, or the impact of that link, at all.


But we routinely have patients that are admitted with pregnancy induced hypertension, pre-eclampsia, eclampsia, renal failure, etc. These conditions have physical and financial consequences, measurable and unmeasurable, and they are borne largely, and in some cases entirely by the woman.

No doubt. My wife had severe pre-eclampsia with our first kid. It sucked hard. But again, if you're going to say considerations like that outweigh the life of the pre-person, you have already assigned a pretty low value to the pre-person's life, and I'm not sure on what grounds. It doesn't really make much sense. You don't seem to think it would be acceptable to abort a baby after it's achieved personhood, right? Even though that is probably the time when most of the negative health consequences to the mother manifest.

I think your argument leaves no way around the fact that you assign great inherent value to the person, even unborn, and very little related inherent value to that person's precursor. It remains weird.

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"People think it must be fun to be a super genius, but they don't realize how hard it is to put up with all the idiots in the world."

-on the grounds that a non-person that has never known existence and thus cannot experience hardship, pain, or loss, does not bear the same level of consideration for the hardship, pain, or loss that the host person and her family may experience as a result of pregnancy. So yes, at that point, I do assign a relatively low value to that form of human life relative to the host and other persons.

It makes sense. You just disagree with the conclusion.

If I recall correctly, you're not exactly on board with the Church's official position and rationale regarding contraception. Are they not operating on the same premise, that it prevents the emergence of a new human life, but taking it one step further back in the process? I would imagine they believe your position, presuming I have my assumptions straight, is likewise nonsensical, or morally indefensible.

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The devil made me do it the first time, second time I done it on my own - W

It makes sense. You just disagree with the conclusion.

Ehh . . . I understand the position, and yes, I disagree with the conclusion. I'm not sure how much sense it actually makes. I see the surface appeal. The more I think about it, the less it holds up to scrutiny.


If I recall correctly, you're not exactly on board with the Church's official position and rationale regarding contraception.

Am I not? You can't just sit there and accuse me of heresy, dude! lol. But I think I'm on board with Catholic teaching on contraception . . .

Are they not operating on the same premise, that it prevents the emergence of a new human life, but taking it one step further back in the process?

No, I don't think that's an accurate description of why the Church opposes contraception, and why it opposes abortion.

The Church maintains that abortion ends a human life. It's killing, of an innocent life.

The Church also recognizes that human life begins at conception. It doesn't, then, oppose contraception because it's the taking of a human life, one step back in the process. It's that contraception is a violation of the natural law, in that it seeks to artificially separate an act- sex- from it's natural end- new life. Basically, it's an indulgence of the sexual appetite for its own sake.

I haven't had much luck explaining "natural law" in here, but the example I've sometimes used is food. Eating is a natural act, with a natural end. That end is nourishment. That doesn't mean you have to eat only for nourishment's sake- it's also normal to eat because you're hungry, and it's normal to eat things because they taste good- enjoyment is a perfectly fine reason to eat something, within reason. But you also shouldn't be a glutton, endless stuffing your face with junk because it tastes good, with no thought to the impact on the ultimate end of eating- nourishment. Especially, though, you shouldn't use some artificial method to be able to overeat while trying to eliminate the natural consequence of doing so. If you pack away three cheesesteaks and then make yourself throw up so you can eat two more, that's wrong. You're separating the act of eating from it's natural and ultimate end. Same with contraception.

Different moral issues, despite the obvious relationship between the two.

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"People think it must be fun to be a super genius, but they don't realize how hard it is to put up with all the idiots in the world."

Sorry, it may not be your dodge, but it is a dodge in the lines of "personhood" philosophy generally.

In formulating the concept of "personhood" you could start with the idea of personhood resting on consciousness (and of course there are various points in formulating that premise -- pretty goods ones, if not complete). However, a person who becomes comatose would cease to be a person. So to retain personhood in such a case the concept of "physical structure capable of sustaining consciousness" can be used.

You say, "once a human being acquires Personhood, they retain the right to that state of being until it can no longer be sustained or restored, as is the case with irreversible brain death." But that is just a fiat and not a necessary conclusion from the premise of "personhood" arising from consciousness. If consciousness is really what determines personhood, I don't see any rationale to give any protections to a comatose person. (Not saying we should not, of course. Also not saying that there are not other rationales for protection of comatose person, just none that arise organically from the concept of personhood.)

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It doesn't really matter what Phil is saying, the music of his voice is the appropriate soundtrack for a bicycle race. HTupolev

It's a dodge in several ways, in addition to the problem what happens to people when they're unconscious. (No offense, sphere.)

Obviously consciousness is a difficult, vague term. It's hard to identify, and so far impossible to tie directly to a physical attribute. It's true that a prefrontal cortex appears necessary for consciousness, but it also seems clear that a prefrontal cortex is not sufficient for consciousness. I don't *think* anyone believes that consciousness exists in the fetus at 24 or 25 weeks, or even immediately after birth. Most tests which we use for consciousness would seem to show that consciousness doesn't exist in humans until they're a year or a year and a half old, maybe even older. If consciousness is the real measure, why not use it? Why rely on some physical trait that doesn't actually correlate to consciousness?

Basically, those who use the beginning of the development of the prefrontal cortex as the beginning of personhood are saying that when some physical structure that has the capacity to develop into something that can support consciousness in the future exists, personhood can be assigned. Problem is that it's not meaningfully different from assigning personhood at conception.

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"People think it must be fun to be a super genius, but they don't realize how hard it is to put up with all the idiots in the world."

Thanks for that.

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It doesn't really matter what Phil is saying, the music of his voice is the appropriate soundtrack for a bicycle race. HTupolev

This was talked about briefly earlier. I brought up the difference between something that was once conscious, is currently unconscious, and will be conscious again versus something that has yet to ever be conscious.

For the former, we look at the person and say, "That is Vitus. We know Vitus (or someone does). Vitus can be Vitus again." When looking at a zygote, OTOH, all we can say about it is that someday that could be someone, but at this moment its not and never has been."

Whether or not you think the distinction is relevant is up to you, but it is a clear distinction. From my perspective, I less of a distinction between "this will some day be a person provided that this woman feeds it nutrients over the next 9 months" and "this egg will some day be a person if we could just it in contact with that sperm which might be killed off by that piece of latex."

On a side note, I want to caution the Nirvana fallacy which attempts to deflate an argument by the imperfectness of the solution. We run into this a lot with origin of life discussions. "I don't fully know how we came to be," is seen as a weaker answer than, "God made us," because despite the lack of evidence, the latter offers a more complete answer.

In this thread we can have a combination of Nirvana and Equivocation. "Once conscious but currently not conscious feels like a wishy washy distinction, so lets settle on something more objective: consciousness (Nirvana). Now that that's settled, this unconscious and that unconscious is pretty much the same (equivocation)."

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-----------------------------Baron Von Speedypants
-----------------------------RunTraining articles here:
http://forum.slowtwitch.com/...runtraining;#1612485

 
Whether or not you think the distinction is relevant is up to you, but it is a clear distinction.

Agreed that there is a distinction. Not really sure how significant it is, or how reasonable the distinction is, ultimately.

I've achieved consciousness, but will surrender it multiple times throughout my life. You maintain that the fact that I've achieved it grants me personhood, and are willing to continue thinking of me as a person when I'm asleep because you're confident I'll regain consciousness in the future. Once I have it, you're going to credit me with keeping it until it's undeniable that I can't get it back, right?

It seems rather arbitrary, when you have the same expectation of the unborn achieving consciousness in the future.

Plus, like I said, there's the issue that you don't really base personhood on consciousness.

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"People think it must be fun to be a super genius, but they don't realize how hard it is to put up with all the idiots in the world."

Good points.


I agree that there is a distinction and it is clear. But then the question becomes what is the distinction (what conceptually explains the difference) and does that concept explain a different class of rights?

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It doesn't really matter what Phil is saying, the music of his voice is the appropriate soundtrack for a bicycle race. HTupolev

Not the unborn. The unthinking. I'm specifically speaking of something prior to brain development.

Having said that, the difference is "you" will be conscious in the future.

In its case, "nothing" will be conscious in the future. It never was a person. A sperm isn't and never was a person. An egg isn't and never was a person. The combination of the two isn't and never was.

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-----------------------------Baron Von Speedypants
-----------------------------RunTraining articles here:
http://forum.slowtwitch.com/...runtraining;#1612485

I mean, I understand the distinction. "There was a 'you.' That 'you' will be again when you wake up."

As opposed to, "There is not yet a person, even if and even though there will be one in the future."

I get it, I just don't think it's as meaningful a distinction as people think.

And I don't think you have a real case to be made regarding brain development.

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"People think it must be fun to be a super genius, but they don't realize how hard it is to put up with all the idiots in the world."