The Transportation Security Administration, which is an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, has been in active operation for 15 or so years, and I was involved with airline security both before its advent -- back in the days when airlines contracted with private screening companies to operate airport security checkpoints -- as well as since it's come online. I've also studied it for years, both academically and professionally. So how effective is TSA?
I'm being honest when I say this: It's really not all that clear to me just how much TSA's methods and activities are protecting the traveling public.
For one, the Government Accountability Office and its inspection reports have been consistently critical of TSA's methods and practices, and GAO has issued a series of stinging reports over the years (including in 2015, 2016 and 2017) as to the agency's effectiveness.
For example, in a 2015 investigation undercover agents from GAO (and possibly DHS inspector general offices, though DHS and TSA have obscured this by claiming that such investigations are "SSI" or "Security Sensitive Information") succeeded in getting weapons past TSA airport checkpoint security screeners an astounding 67 out of 70 times.
Also, TSA checkpoint security screeners at the Minneapolis-St. Paul international airport recently failed to detect 95-percent of prohibited items placed into test luggage by undercover TSA investigators working as part of what's called a "red team." In the tests, red team members were able to successfully sneak explosive materials, fake weapons and drugs through checkpoints on 17 out of 18 test runs.
TSA maintains that this success rate doesn't necessarily mean that 95-percent of all prohibited items would make it through security, because TSA red teams are highly skilled at being able to detect weaknesses in security. For what it's worth, so are trained terrorists and non-state terror groups, both of which would spend a great deal of time observing security checkpoints for weaknesses before attempting to penetrate security. At any rate, TSA red team operatives placed prohibited items into luggage, all of which go through X-ray machines, at minimum, and possibly are also screened using explosive trace detection (ETD) machines. Even a normal level of attentiveness on the part of TSA agents should have caught these items.
I've manned those X-ray machines (through which travelers' carry-on luggage passes), magnetometers (through which travelers themselves pass) and explosive trace detection machines (where luggage is subjected to additional testing and scrutiny). You have to work hard to miss 67 out of 70 travelers and/or pieces of carry-on luggage hiding or containing a weapon of some sort.
In this regard, private checkpoint security companies perform at rates similar to or better than TSA, something we know from studying their performance at large airports where TSA has granted waivers allowing those facilities to employ private contractors to handle security checkpoints.
In addition, one security design firm that contracted with TSA to provide services pointed out that the means and manner by which standard TSA security checkpoints operate actually hurt security procedures. This was because the procedures TSA insisted on gave all travelers a heightened sense of anxiety that made them appear as if they were themselves terrorists or drug smugglers.Travelers' behavior and demeanor changed, in other words, making them appear to TSA behavior detection officers (BDO) as if they had something to hide.
In my own security observational studies of TSA I used to refer to this as the "TSA treats everyone as if they're criminals Effect." Think of how much more difficult it is to pick an object out in turbulent waters versus calm, clear waters. If everyone is walking through an airport checkpoint security station being treated as if they're a criminal or a terrorist -- with they themselves sweating and nervous as a result of their treatment -- it will become much more difficult to pick out the ones who actually are criminals and terrorists.
So are you any safer today -- when going through a TSA airport security checkpoint -- than you were pre 9/11, at least as far as air transportation is concerned (TSA also has responsibility for train and other forms of mass public transportation, including cruise ships, by the way)? It's hard to say. TSA and DHS and their supporters like to say that while the public misses (such as the ones I described above) garner all the headlines, we have no idea just how many plots or attempts have been stopped by the agency.
To me, this is a non-falsifiable statement on the part of TSA and others, given that all such data that could be produced to support that claim is supposedly classified to prevent the terrorist enemy from gleaning "sources and methods" from them. We also have reams of data and reports highlighting TSA shortcomings in baggage screening and a number of failures to prevent prohibited items such as guns, knives and explosives from making it onto airliners.
Fiscally, what sort of "bang for our buck" are we getting from TSA? The federal agency's FY 2017 budget was projected to be $7.6 billion. Are we receiving billions and billions of dollars more in security protection and peace of mind from TSA than we were before the agency's creation? I'm not so sure.
EXCLUSIVE: Undercover DHS Tests Find Security Failures at US Airports - ABC News
U.S. GAO - Aviation Security: TSA Does Not Have Valid Evidence Supporting Most of the Revised Behavioral Indicators Used in Its Behavior Detection Activities
TSA Agents at Minneapolis Airport Failed 95% of Undercover Security Tests | Travel + Leisure
"Politics is just show business for ugly people."
I'm being honest when I say this: It's really not all that clear to me just how much TSA's methods and activities are protecting the traveling public.
For one, the Government Accountability Office and its inspection reports have been consistently critical of TSA's methods and practices, and GAO has issued a series of stinging reports over the years (including in 2015, 2016 and 2017) as to the agency's effectiveness.
For example, in a 2015 investigation undercover agents from GAO (and possibly DHS inspector general offices, though DHS and TSA have obscured this by claiming that such investigations are "SSI" or "Security Sensitive Information") succeeded in getting weapons past TSA airport checkpoint security screeners an astounding 67 out of 70 times.
Also, TSA checkpoint security screeners at the Minneapolis-St. Paul international airport recently failed to detect 95-percent of prohibited items placed into test luggage by undercover TSA investigators working as part of what's called a "red team." In the tests, red team members were able to successfully sneak explosive materials, fake weapons and drugs through checkpoints on 17 out of 18 test runs.
TSA maintains that this success rate doesn't necessarily mean that 95-percent of all prohibited items would make it through security, because TSA red teams are highly skilled at being able to detect weaknesses in security. For what it's worth, so are trained terrorists and non-state terror groups, both of which would spend a great deal of time observing security checkpoints for weaknesses before attempting to penetrate security. At any rate, TSA red team operatives placed prohibited items into luggage, all of which go through X-ray machines, at minimum, and possibly are also screened using explosive trace detection (ETD) machines. Even a normal level of attentiveness on the part of TSA agents should have caught these items.
I've manned those X-ray machines (through which travelers' carry-on luggage passes), magnetometers (through which travelers themselves pass) and explosive trace detection machines (where luggage is subjected to additional testing and scrutiny). You have to work hard to miss 67 out of 70 travelers and/or pieces of carry-on luggage hiding or containing a weapon of some sort.
In this regard, private checkpoint security companies perform at rates similar to or better than TSA, something we know from studying their performance at large airports where TSA has granted waivers allowing those facilities to employ private contractors to handle security checkpoints.
In addition, one security design firm that contracted with TSA to provide services pointed out that the means and manner by which standard TSA security checkpoints operate actually hurt security procedures. This was because the procedures TSA insisted on gave all travelers a heightened sense of anxiety that made them appear as if they were themselves terrorists or drug smugglers.Travelers' behavior and demeanor changed, in other words, making them appear to TSA behavior detection officers (BDO) as if they had something to hide.
In my own security observational studies of TSA I used to refer to this as the "TSA treats everyone as if they're criminals Effect." Think of how much more difficult it is to pick an object out in turbulent waters versus calm, clear waters. If everyone is walking through an airport checkpoint security station being treated as if they're a criminal or a terrorist -- with they themselves sweating and nervous as a result of their treatment -- it will become much more difficult to pick out the ones who actually are criminals and terrorists.
So are you any safer today -- when going through a TSA airport security checkpoint -- than you were pre 9/11, at least as far as air transportation is concerned (TSA also has responsibility for train and other forms of mass public transportation, including cruise ships, by the way)? It's hard to say. TSA and DHS and their supporters like to say that while the public misses (such as the ones I described above) garner all the headlines, we have no idea just how many plots or attempts have been stopped by the agency.
To me, this is a non-falsifiable statement on the part of TSA and others, given that all such data that could be produced to support that claim is supposedly classified to prevent the terrorist enemy from gleaning "sources and methods" from them. We also have reams of data and reports highlighting TSA shortcomings in baggage screening and a number of failures to prevent prohibited items such as guns, knives and explosives from making it onto airliners.
Fiscally, what sort of "bang for our buck" are we getting from TSA? The federal agency's FY 2017 budget was projected to be $7.6 billion. Are we receiving billions and billions of dollars more in security protection and peace of mind from TSA than we were before the agency's creation? I'm not so sure.
EXCLUSIVE: Undercover DHS Tests Find Security Failures at US Airports - ABC News
U.S. GAO - Aviation Security: TSA Does Not Have Valid Evidence Supporting Most of the Revised Behavioral Indicators Used in Its Behavior Detection Activities
TSA Agents at Minneapolis Airport Failed 95% of Undercover Security Tests | Travel + Leisure
"Politics is just show business for ugly people."