Boeing Woes

My first construction project was an industrial wastewater treatment plant at Boeing’s military aircraft division in Wichita.

I remember Boeing calling in a rep from each company to chastise us about quality.
They bragged that they do not have quality issues. They pointed out what was at risk if they had quality issues.

This morning I read that the door blew off because someone at Boeing forgot to install some bolts.

This morning I read that the door blew off because someone at Boeing forgot to install some bolts.

Of course true engineers or scientists would never claim to have “no” quality issues. Per the “six sigma” doctrine, you just try to drive it to vanishingly low levels. Where humans are involved, there will be error.

The bolt part surprises me. Because on some similarly critical systems I’ve seen worked on, there’s the guy who does the bolts, and then there’s a different guy with a checklist that includes inspection of every single bolt. You’ve got to have two guys completely screw up to miss a bolt. I will say it’s very easy as the checklist guy to start just jamming down the checklist as stupid bureaucratic busywork when you go through months and months of the first guy never making a mistake. But in my case, you had to write your name on the checklist. I wonder if Boeing has a checklist with some dude’s name on it for the missing bolts.

My similar moment was when some Chevron engineers came to my high school class. Some “woke” (for circa 1990) classmate of mine asked if they could make engines any more efficient to use less oil. The engineers scoffed and said that the thermodynamics of engines was a “solved” issue, and nothing more could be done.

This was, of course, before widespread modern improvements in variable valve timing, direct injection, cylinder deactivation, higher compression ratios, and truly good turbos, etc, have made engines much more efficient since then. I knew they were full of it even at the time.

This morning I read that the door blew off because someone at Boeing forgot to install some bolts.

CBS news had an interesting story this morning about the inspections Alaska Airlines is doing on the doors. So far they’ve found some loose bolts but none actually missing.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alaska-airlines-inspection-boeing-737-max-9-planes/

The article also says the investigation into flight 1282 is still underway.
Investigators are still working to determine if those key bolts were in place when the door panel blew out of Alaska Airlines flight 1282, but that airline and United have both started to send Boeing 737 Max 9 jets back into the air as service resumes with the proper clearance.

I read it in WSJ this morning.

Trail apparently was still in high school when I was working on the IWWTP at Being. I don’t recall Six Sigma being a thing back then.

Off topic, a jobsite next to ours punctured a very large gas line. Repair guy shows up and starts beating on the pipe with a large hammer. I was wondering if I should excuse myself from the area. Fortunately, nothing blew up.

The reason we were expanding their treatment plant was because sludge discharge was so thick that ducks were walking across the pond. BTW, ducks do bite. Feels like a clothes clip lined with sand paper.

This morning I read that the door blew off because someone at Boeing forgot to install some bolts.

Of course true engineers or scientists would never claim to have “no” quality issues. Per the “six sigma” doctrine, you just try to drive it to vanishingly low levels. Where humans are involved, there will be error.

The bolt part surprises me. Because on some similarly critical systems I’ve seen worked on, there’s the guy who does the bolts, and then there’s a different guy with a checklist that includes inspection of every single bolt. You’ve got to have two guys completely screw up to miss a bolt. I will say it’s very easy as the checklist guy to start just jamming down the checklist as stupid bureaucratic busywork when you go through months and months of the first guy never making a mistake.

I’m a quality systems guy and I doubt their system is that simple. For something like a bolt holding a door on, they probably have electronic proximity and torque validation. I would also assume they do an allocation of parts when assembling a plane. Like IKEA furniture, they should have a system that tells them they have bolts left over when the plane is done. I’m guessing they had what looked like a fool-proof system in place and someone over road it.

There have been several whistleblowers from within the company on this and the other issues with the 737 program. The entire thing is basically due to corner cutting by management in pursuit of shareholder value.

No doubt, this was a screw up by Boeing. And, people who follow the company say it is a predictable consequence of the company becoming more finance-driven than engineering-driven.

Still, their planes have an incredible safety record in recent times. Crashes involving a major airline are almost unheard of. It is easy — and justified — to mock them for a door plug falling off under modest pressure, but when you step back and look at the bigger picture, they have done impressively well.

Why should they change if killing hundreds of people only results in a slap on the wrist?

Why should they change if killing hundreds of people only results in a slap on the wrist?
This.

The 737 is a terribly designed frankenstein of an aircraft.

This morning I read that the door blew off because someone at Boeing forgot to install some bolts.

Of course true engineers or scientists would never claim to have “no” quality issues. Per the “six sigma” doctrine, you just try to drive it to vanishingly low levels. Where humans are involved, there will be error.

The bolt part surprises me. Because on some similarly critical systems I’ve seen worked on, there’s the guy who does the bolts, and then there’s a different guy with a checklist that includes inspection of every single bolt. You’ve got to have two guys completely screw up to miss a bolt. I will say it’s very easy as the checklist guy to start just jamming down the checklist as stupid bureaucratic busywork when you go through months and months of the first guy never making a mistake.

I’m a quality systems guy and I doubt their system is that simple. For something like a bolt holding a door on, they probably have electronic proximity and torque validation. I would also assume they do an allocation of parts when assembling a plane. Like IKEA furniture, they should have a system that tells them they have bolts left over when the plane is done. I’m guessing they had what looked like a fool-proof system in place and someone over road it.

WSJ / investigators indicate that there’s a lack of documentation and flawed processes (you think??) around the door plug. I imagine with multiple vendors/suppliers there’s also some finger pointing. Read that the fuselage comes with the door plug in place, which is then removed, then re-installed. Apparently it’s not clear to know if the bolts were re-installed in this case.

Why should they change if killing hundreds of people only results in a slap on the wrist?
This.

The 737 is a terribly designed frankenstein of an aircraft.

Care to expand on that statement?

This morning I read that the door blew off because someone at Boeing forgot to install some bolts.

Of course true engineers or scientists would never claim to have “no” quality issues. Per the “six sigma” doctrine, you just try to drive it to vanishingly low levels. Where humans are involved, there will be error.

The bolt part surprises me. Because on some similarly critical systems I’ve seen worked on, there’s the guy who does the bolts, and then there’s a different guy with a checklist that includes inspection of every single bolt. You’ve got to have two guys completely screw up to miss a bolt. I will say it’s very easy as the checklist guy to start just jamming down the checklist as stupid bureaucratic busywork when you go through months and months of the first guy never making a mistake.

I’m a quality systems guy and I doubt their system is that simple. For something like a bolt holding a door on, they probably have electronic proximity and torque validation. I would also assume they do an allocation of parts when assembling a plane. Like IKEA furniture, they should have a system that tells them they have bolts left over when the plane is done. I’m guessing they had what looked like a fool-proof system in place and someone over road it.

WSJ / investigators indicate that there’s a lack of documentation and flawed processes (you think??) around the door plug. I imagine with multiple vendors/suppliers there’s also some finger pointing. Read that the fuselage comes with the door plug in place, which is then removed, then re-installed. Apparently it’s not clear to know if the bolts were re-installed in this case.

My previous employer made those cafeteria tables that fold up and roll around. Some time before I was there, one of them fell on someone because it wasn’t assembled correctly and lead to a lawsuit. Because of that we had as fixture that recorded the torque and presence of every fastener on the table as well as the temp and amount of glue that was used. If one of those tables left the plant without a bolt, it was because someone bypassed the inspection system.

We were making tables, not airplanes.

Why should they change if killing hundreds of people only results in a slap on the wrist?
This.

The 737 is a terribly designed frankenstein of an aircraft.

Care to expand on that statement?

I doubt you want to learn. But this is a start. The plane, all the versions that currently fly, is just a ridiculous boondoggle.
https://www.latimes.com/…-20190315-story.html

“Boeing has to sit down and ask itself how long they can keep updating this airplane,” said Douglas Moss, an instructor at USC’s Viterbi Aviation Safety and Security Program, a former United Airlines captain, an attorney and a former Air Force test pilot. “We are getting to the point where legacy features are such a drag on the airplane that we have to go to a clean-sheet airplane.”

As I understand this, the basic 737 is hardly a Frankenstein. It has been highly successful. But, Boeing reached a point with the Max where it would have been better to design a new plane from scratch rather than keep trying to push the 737 to accommodate all these changes. Of course, the former is a long-term solution and a finance-driven company might prefer the much cheaper solution of tweaking the 737.

Why should they change if killing hundreds of people only results in a slap on the wrist?
This.

The 737 is a terribly designed frankenstein of an aircraft.

Care to expand on that statement?

The original aircraft was designed for a smaller engine. Rather than spend money to redesign the aircraft, they chose to stick a giant engine on the same plane completely changing the flight characteristics. And then they expected software to compensate without having to retrain pilots. The end result was killing hundreds of people to save money.

As I understand this, the basic 737 is hardly a Frankenstein. It has been highly successful. But, Boeing reached a point with the Max where it would have been better to design a new plane from scratch rather than keep trying to push the 737 to accommodate all these changes. Of course, the former is a long-term solution and a finance-driven company might prefer the much cheaper solution of tweaking the 737.

Boeing reached that point way before the max.

The plane exists for only 2 reasons:

Boeing’s desire to maximise quarterly results at any cost.

And airlines’ desire to absolutely minimize the amount of training given to pilots. Hence, many pilots are just “iPad qualified” (half an hour of audiovisuals on an iPad, this is not figurative, it’s literal).

As I understand this, the basic 737 is hardly a Frankenstein. It has been highly successful. But, Boeing reached a point with the Max where it would have been better to design a new plane from scratch rather than keep trying to push the 737 to accommodate all these changes. Of course, the former is a long-term solution and a finance-driven company might prefer the much cheaper solution of tweaking the 737.

Replacing the 737 is going to very difficult for many reasons.

Ignoring the cost of the new program, there are other huge issues.

First, once that new airframe is announced for sale, then Boeing is not selling anymore 737s or at least selling them for any profit. Airlines are not going to be ordering a 737 when they could buy the replacement that burns 20% less fuel and other advantages. Boeing is also going to have price the replacement at the same price as 737 due to pressure from airbus. This is a huge issue, because it means the time between when Boeing starts selling the new airplane and the time it takes to get this new airplane up to 40 per month, needs to be a shorter length of time than the current 737 back order. So this is all new technologies and having to deliver them at rate in a few years is very difficult.

The second big issue outside of cost is technology. What if you come out with a 737 replacement and soon after that some major technologies come out that can’t be put into this 737 replacement because of basic architecture? Then airbus comes out with a new airframe that has that technology and dominates. There is good reason to believe some new technologies are coming out in 5 to 10 years that are going to have to be built into the design.

I wonder what the morale is like for the designers, they design a great airplane and the company screws it all up putting profits ahead of safety, I’d be pissed.

I wouldn’t say the MAX is a terrible design. It was a good design given the constraints and objectives of the program. Yes, it had at least one major flaw that led to the crashes. but engineers have to remember that the best design from a technical perspective isn’t always the best overall design.

Why should they change if killing hundreds of people only results in a slap on the wrist?
This.

The 737 is a terribly designed frankenstein of an aircraft.

Not really.

Adding the new larger engines to the max was totally fine in really every way but one and that was keeping the same pilot type rating and only in one area.

The force the yoke versus angle of attack was identical to the 737 NG, until very high angle of attacks. These angle of attacks were areas most pilots would never see, but to keep commonality with with the NG the force on the yoke even in these extreme areas had to be the same for both models. On the max at these extreme angles of attack, the force was lower than the NG.

So if they didn’t need the common type rating, they wouldn’t have needed MCAS and would have flown fine. It was all about keeping that type rating the same. Nothing to do with the fundamentals of the airframe.