Mojo - whatever happened to that dude named Bin Laden? I thought you Hawks were going to chase him to the end of the earth? You’ve had 4 years, unlimited funds and resources and still haven’t been able to get the job done. It’s only proved that Hawks can’t win a war. So, you have 18 more months to get the job done and then you’re getting you’re ass fired, and yes, we may have to pull the plug in Iraq, but so what.
I stand corrected. But the point is that Al-Qaida is stronger than ever in Iraq. The Bush administration has created it’s own monster.
No disagreement there. Iraq has been a great recruiting opportunity for terror groups.
“I wonder if the Bush administration has actually made the situation worse?”
How many Al-Qaida were in Iraq before Bush invaded. None. Absolutely zero because Sadaam would have killed them.
This is completely false.
You must have missed the latest memos from Zawahiri.
The reason we invaded Iraq was not directly related to al-Qeada. It was to remove Saddam from power, secure the threat of WMDs, and destroy Iraq’s military capabilities. The operations now involving al-Qeada are a result of this original mission.
There is a report by 16 intelligence agencies that show pre-2001 and 2007 capabilities.
So where is the report stating what the capabilites of al-Qeada would be if the ‘‘War on Terror’’ had not been prosecuted for the last 5 years? Without that, this report means nothing. Not to mention, this is not a report by the 16 itelligence agencies. This is an NIE, which is still in draft form, that must be approved by the 16 itelligence agencies. You really need to be more accurate in your reporting.
I doubt they will show it to you.
I think you would be surprised at what I get to see.
Also, I don’t think Afghanistan was a wasted effort.
Neither do I.
I just believe we should not have wasted resources in Iraq and instead should have focused all attention in Afghanistan.
Hind sight being 20/20, I am sure the vast majority of people would agree with this statement.
**History will show that Iraq only motivated and strengthed the enemy. **
How did it strengthen the enemy? Even this bogus report states that the ‘‘enemy’’ is only at the same strength that is was 6 years ago. What kind of analysis are you using to make the ‘‘same’’ equal stronger?
“The operations now involving al-Qeada are a result of this original mission.”
Well, maybe so. What is your point?
Well, maybe so. What is your point?
That the original mission in Iraq was not directly related to al-Qeada. Which is what I initially stated and you seemed to be trying to refute with a reference to Zawahiri.
" As far as I’m concerned, the war in Afghanistan is the only one directly related to al-Qaeda."
I was responding to the above. This statement is impossible to justify in the present tense when both Bush and Zawahiri both say that Iraq is the central front in the war, and AQ is being killed there every day by both American and Iraqi forces. Take a look at the turn around in Anbar Provence for example.
Now if you want to argue that had we taken different actions four years ago, there wouldn’t be a big AQ problem in Iraq, just a big Saddam Hussein problem, I would agree.
Now if you want to argue that had we taken different actions four years ago, there wouldn’t be a big AQ problem in Iraq, just a big Saddam Hussein problem, I would agree.
I don’t want to ‘‘argue’’ at all. The war in Afghanistan was and is directly related to al-Qeada. The war in Iraq was directly related to the overthrow of Saddam, removing the threat of WMDs, and destroying Iraq’s military capabilites. The war in Iraq is now directly related to quelling the sunni/shia insurgencies long enough to allow the Iraqi government to assume political control of its country. al-Qeada is definately a factor in Iraq, but they are not the focus of effort. Therefore, the war in Iraq is not ‘‘directly’’ related to al-Qeada.
So, the war in which we are engaging and killing AQ every day and in the country where they actually control territory is not “directly” related to AQ, but the war in Afghanistan where they can barely be found on a bad day is “directly” related to AQ.
Whatever.
You really will argue with anyone over anything won’t you?
Ask yourself these two questions (you may need to consult with someone who knows something about military operations):
What was the strategic focus of effort when we invaded Afghanistan?
What was the strategic focus of effort when we invaded Iraq?
The answer to those two questions will tell you what each operation was directly related to.
I already offered to agree with you in the 2003 context. Can’t you take yes for an answer?
You need to stop confusing “was directly related to” with “is directly related to.” The year is now 2007.
You need to stop confusing “was directly related to” with “is directly related to.” The year is now 2007.
This is why I was continuing with the debate, because, apparently, you still don’t realize that even in the year 2007, if the Iraqi government became stable enough to run its own country the military mission, that is currently on-going, would be finished, despite the continued efforts of al-Qeada. Therefore, although we are kiling al-Qeada operatives on a nearly daily basis in Iraq, the focus of effort, which in stategic terms means ‘‘what the operation is directly related to,’’ is enabling the Iraqi government to build and maintain political control over its country.
What is it with words today? I find myself arguing with people I agree with.
I suppose you could argue that our helping Saudi Arabia kill AQ has nothing to do with AQ, but just helping a moderate regime keep power.
It all depends on what your definition of ‘‘is’’ is. 
Some opinion on this issue from Stratfor, a private intelligence corporation sometimes referred to as the “Shadow CIA,” whose analyses are relied upon heavily by folks outside and inside of government:
*Stratfor cannot analyze the contents of the report because we have not read it; so far, no one has felt it necessary to commit a felony by leaking this specific document to us. But the general thrust of the document, that al Qaeda has regenerated, is clear. **Many of Stratfor’s readers have noted that this position clashes with our recently clarified assessment that, while al Qaeda remains dangerous, the group’s day in the sun is over. *
**
The first and most important question to ask when looking at this leaked report, then, is which al Qaeda is being discussed.
Evolution and misuse of terminology means there are now two.
The first is the al Qaeda that carried out the 9/11 attacks. This group deeply understands how intelligence agencies work, and therefore how to avoid them. After the 9/11 attacks, however, this group’s security protocols forced it to go underground, pushing itself deeper into the cave each time it thought one of its assets or plans had been compromised. The result was a steady degradation of capabilities, with its attacks proving less and less significant. Stratfor now estimates that, while this al Qaeda – which we often refer to as the apex leadership, or al Qaeda prime – still exists and is still dangerous, it is no longer a strategic threat to the United States. Its members can carry out attacks, but not ones of the grandeur and horror of 9/11, or even of the Madrid bombings, that achieve the group’s goal of forcing policy changes on Western governments.
The second al Qaeda is a result of the apex leadership’s isolation. It represents a range of largely disconnected Islamist militants who either have been inspired by the real al Qaeda or who seek to use the name to bolster their credibility. While many of these groups are rather amateurish, others are deadly efficient. It is best to think of them as al Qaeda franchises. However, these franchises lack the security policy or vision of their predecessor, and they do not constitute a strategic threat.
The difference between a strategic and a tactical threat is the core distinction, and one that should not be trivialized. There are hundreds of militant groups in the world that pose tactical threats, and many of them are indeed affiliated with al Qaeda in some way. As a bombmaker or expert marksman, a single person possesses the skills to kill many people, but that does not make that individual a strategic threat to the United States.
Posing a strategic threat requires the ability to carry out operations in a foreign land, raise and transfer funds, recruit and relocate people, train and hide promising agents, a multitude of reconnaissance and technical skills, and – most important – the ability to do all this while avoiding detection before striking at a target of national importance. Yes, an attack against a local mall or a regional airport would be a calamity, but it would not be the sort of strategic attack against national targets that reshapes Western geopolitics as 9/11 did.
Charging that al Qaeda is as strong now as it was in 2001 simply seems a bridge too far. Prior to 9/11, al Qaeda was running multiple operations across multiple regions simultaneously. Its agents were traveling the globe regularly and operating very much in the open financially. Their vision of resurrecting the caliphate was a large and difficult one. Achieving that vision required mobilizing the Muslim masses, and this required spectacular attacks.
A spectacular attack is what they carried out – once. Since then, all the apex leadership has done is issue a seemingly endless string of empty threats , and consequently its credibility is in tatters. No one doubts al Qaeda’s desire to strike at the United States as hard and as often as possible, but the lack of activity indicates its capabilities simply do not measure up.
And even if al Qaeda did not have a goal that required regular attacks, we would still doubt the veracity of this report. If an intelligence agency has penetrated an organization sufficiently to be aware of its full capabilities, the last thing the agency would want to disclose is this success. The agency would keep its intelligence secret until it had neutralized the militants.
Shouting to the world that it knows what the militants are up to tells the militants they have been penetrated and starts them on the process of going underground and sealing the leak.
Which, of course, raises the question: What is this report actually seeking to accomplish? That depends on who commissioned the report in the first place, and – considering the size of the U.S. intelligence community – it could well mean just about anything. A partial list of justifications could include: an effort to pressure Pakistan into cracking down on al Qaeda for fear that the group is just about ready to launch another attack, an effort by the U.S. administration to regenerate its political fortunes by reconsolidating national security conservatives under its wing, a plea for more funding for this or that branch of U.S. security forces, a general warning to force any militants currently planning attacks to pull back and reassess – in essence, an effort by intelligence services to disrupt any cells they have been unable to penetrate, or even an effort by one branch of the government to discredit the efforts of another. But regardless of which memos are floating around in Washington these days, al Qaeda prime is not feeling all that confident of late. In his most recent taped release (al Qaeda’s attacks have sputtered but its multimedia arm is booming), deputy al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri calls on Muslims everywhere to focus their efforts on the jihad in Afghanistan. He does not focus on Iraq, where the fires burn bright, or on Pakistan, where the apex leadership resides.
It appears the Pakistani government is on the verge of finally moving in force against al Qaeda in the country, and a looming U.S.-Iranian rapprochement is making the position of foreign jihadists in Iraq increasingly tenuous. That leaves the movement with only the mountains of Afghanistan for shelter. After all, there is no spot on the globe farther away from what the West might consider friendly shores.