Sad news for the crew and lots of people on the ground. Some reports of an engine fire, and even an engine separation.
The 3-engine md-11 / dc-10 aircraft family has had a lot of crashes over its operational life. And, apparently, this particular plane was over 30 years old.
From my former instructor who’s now a FO at Delta, who knows a Delta captain who knows a UPS pilot because he used to be part 135 before jumping to part 121, who knows another UPS pilot who was there. The plane was delayed for maintenance on the left engine. Everyone assuming this is relevant for obvious reasons. Left engine separated on takeoff. The ensuing fire or FOD was ingested into the center engine which had a compressor surge and was partial power. MD-11 was Honolulu bound (at max takeoff weight) it could not climb on 1.3 engines or however much thrust they could get out of the centerline engine. That crew didn’t stand a chance.
From nominal departure to dead in a few seconds. Students are usually scared of landings. Seasoned pilots are scared of departures.
Edit - I’m deleting my post as don’t think I was properly conveying my utter disbelief in the way that this happened, and the pictures depicting it.
I don’t want to be misconstrued as being blazė about this tragedy; I was merely amazed at the pics of the failure.
My dad is here and we talked about this last night (he was a career pilot for ~30yrs). He said that pilots train extensively for engine failure scenarios on takeoff, and the combination of instrumentation warnings and change in feel at the controls should have resulted in the pilots executing an immediate reduction in power and pushing the nose down. It’s drilled into them that, regardless of ground speed, getting back on the ground is a better outcome 100% of the time than remaining airborne. Even if you run off the end of the runway, it’s still categorically better than the alternative.
FDR and CVR will hopefully shine light on their decision to remain airborne.
Of course, it’s armchair quarterbacking, but my dad saw those photos, noted how close to the ground they still were when everything would have told them something was wrong, and he believes they absolutely stood a chance.
With all due respect to your dad, looking at these photos, it is pretty clear that the plane was airborne when things went south. All of the training for airline pilots tells them that, once your aircraft passes V1 (and no one aborts), then you have no choice but to try and fly. Given that the engine literally broke off the wing, it is likely that the pilots had very, very little notice that they were now operating on 2 engines, and then only 1 engine.
No airline training encourages or even covers landing an airplane in a field or in a populated area for ANY reason (not talking about general aviation single engine training, talking about airline training). And these MD-11 pilots had every reason to believe that, once they achieved V2, their plane would indeed climb sufficiently on 2 engines and at least being capable of immediately returning to land. However, this plane did not have full power on 2 engines, so clearly that was gonna be impossible. But the amount of time that the pilots had to process info was infinitesimally small, all while they were busy trying to control the plane, and with a million alarms going off.
No way the pilots had a chance with this kind 1-in-a-million type of failure.
We talk about this incident a lot during human factors training for aircraft mechanics. If I recall, the mechanics took a shortcut and used a huge forklift to remove both the engine and pylon together as one unit rather than what the maintenance procedure tells you to do and remove them separately.
As was told to me, the guys doing the work had hung the engine/pylon with just the primary fuse pins on the wing’s leading edge and went to lunch, leaving the weight of the engine and pylon on the forklift. When you shut off a forklift, they sometimes “creep,” which is what apparently happened and put an incredible strain on the pylon mounts.
He said -exactly- the opposite of that. “Even past V1…”
Of course, unless there’s anyone who’s been through an engine separation on takeoff and lived to tell about it, it’s pretty difficult to bridge the gap between training and instinct, and we’re all armchair quarterbacking.
It might be worth it to understand (or review) what V1 is:
“V1 is a critical speed during takeoff — the speed by which the decision to continue or abort the takeoff must be made. Before reaching V1, the aircraft can safely stop on the runway. After passing V1, the pilot must continue the takeoff, even if an emergency arises, because the aircraft won’t have enough runway left to stop safely.”
The pilots did as they were trained, but likely they were unable to reach (or maintain) V2 after rotation/take off. Or maybe they reached V2, but the loss of power on yet another engine then caused the speed to bleed away. That is probably even more likely.
Maybe airline training is different than corporate, or training has changed over the decades? I’ve got my dad sitting here saying that it was drilled into him over and over through training and sim sessions that even past V1 (or Vr), with a cavalcade of warnings and the drastic change of feel in the controls, even if you’re a few feet AGL, throw the anchor out or set the thing back down. This is direct experience from a career corporate pilot, although he stopped flying professionally 30yrs ago.
Yes, I am sure everything changes slightly over time. But I think what really changes with corporate vs (some) airline flying is that, when flying a corporate jet, the crew is very rarely runway limited. But with flying a very large or very heavy aircraft, the power settings and/or the weight of the aircraft are such that if the pilot aborts after V1, the aircraft is most certainly going to go off the end of runway with hull damage, property damage, injuries, death, or all four. Other than at very small airports, rarely would that happen with a prompt abort after V1 with a corporate jet. Or so one would think.