The disparity between the “lever” and “fat man” cases might be explained by the different apparent probability of success:
Pulling the lever has obvious consequences with very little possibility of error.
Pushing the fat man is kind of dicey – he might resist (possibly injuring the thrower), he might miss the trolley, he might not be big enough to stop the trolley, a fat man big enough to actually stop a trolley is likely too big to push in the first place, etc. If anything went wrong, the fat man would still be dead, and the trolley might still roll on to kill the other 4.
WRT to trolley path, the fat man case has much more unrealistic consequences of the actor’s actions than the lever case.
…this shows a psychological aversion to personal contact with the “victim” …
I disagree (respectfully, of course).
I suspect the issue is the adjective. People will not push the fat man for fear that they will be seen as pushing him because he is fat. There is a strong evolutionary incentive to modify our actions based on how they are perceived by our peers. It is one thing to push someone to save five. But to push a fat person because he is fat is inexcusable. Not that we are pushing him because he is fat, but that this is how it will be perceived.
***If you’re watching a train from an overpass, completely oblivious to the man behind you preparing to toss you overboard, I think it’s fair to say you’re unaware of your fate. It’s no different than Joe Sixpack eating his lunch on the tracks below, oblivious to the train approaching from behind. ***
Not at all. In one scenario the one is either tied down or incommunicato. In the other, you are close enough to advise so that the fat man can choose or not.
"Not at all. In one scenario the one is either tied down or incommunicato. In the other, you are close enough to advise so that the fat man can choose or not. "
I think you’re digging too deep. We need to accept the problem for what it is, which is an attempt to determine if sacrificing a life is viewed differently when you have to come face to face with the person whose life you’re sacrificing than it is when the person is “out of sight/out of mind.”
The problem states, in both scenarios, that the only way to save the 5 people is to sacrifice the 1. I think, keeping the goals of the survey in mind, it’s safe to assume that both courses of action will be succesful, that both actions involve the sacrifice of a person who is unable to affect the outcome of the situation, and that “fat” has little to do with it, except that it helps with the story about needing a heavy object to stop the trolley.
In my current situation as the father of a dependent toddler, I would make the decision to save him no matter how many variables you introduce.
If it were one thousand or one million, I would choose the same. The number of victims would be immaterial to my decision, assuming this was a situation thrust upon us.
***If you’re watching a train from an overpass, completely oblivious to the man behind you preparing to toss you overboard, I think it’s fair to say you’re unaware of your fate. It’s no different than Joe Sixpack eating his lunch on the tracks below, oblivious to the train approaching from behind. ***
Not at all. In one scenario the one is either tied down or incommunicato. In the other, you are close enough to advise so that the fat man can choose or not.
My mistake. We’re working with different scenarios. The one I posted is not the one I’ve encountered repeatedly. Perhaps the victims were made oblivious workers rather than tied-down hostages to adjust for this consideration.
We need to accept the problem for what it is, which is an attempt to determine if sacrificing a life is viewed differently when you have to come face to face with the person whose life you’re sacrificing than it is when the person is “out of sight/out of mind.”
I think you are begging the question. The issue is that people respond differently to the two scenarios. The question is why? You contend it is proximity. I contend it is choice. How would people respond to the scenario if the fat man is unconscious and can not be revived? I think you would find that many more would be willing to push him off the bridge than if he were next to you and aware of the situation. And, that, I think is the rub.
True. Although I’ve never been the type to form reactive judgments or opinions. Most of my social/political views put me at a personal disadvantage, or at least come with no material personal benefit.
We need to accept the problem for what it is, which is an attempt to determine if sacrificing a life is viewed differently when you have to come face to face with the person whose life you’re sacrificing than it is when the person is “out of sight/out of mind.”
I think you are begging the question. The issue is that people respond differently to the two scenarios. The question is why? You contend it is proximity. I contend it is choice. How would people respond to the scenario if the fat man is unconscious and can not be revived? I think you would find that many more would be willing to push him off the bridge than if he were next to you and aware of the situation. And, that, I think is the rub.
Your point is valid; more people probably would toss him over if they presumed he’s non-viable, but that would change the dynamics of the problem (the victim he would replace is currently in no jeopardy unless you put him in harm’s way. The obvious choice would be to throw the corpse in front of the train, thus saving six). For the sake of the intended question, let’s assume both potential single victims are awake, alert, and unaware of their predicament.
Did not mean to suggest that. Just passed out or in a deep sleep.
For the sake of the intended question, let’s assume both potential single victims are awake, alert, and unaware of their predicament.
OK. Scenario 1 is oblivious person who can not be seen or warned and but must be sacrificed to save 5 by pushing a button.
Scenario 2 is oblivious person who can not be advised of potential choice because there is no time to do so but must be sacrificed by shoving off a bridge to save 5.
I am not certain that the difference in response would be significant. If it were, I would have to conclude that it is proximity only. But that is not so much a moral factor as it is a yuck factor, I think. The real moral question comes with Scenario 3 where you would sacrifice someone knowing it was against their will. In Scenarios 1 and 2, many of us would rationalize our decisions as ones with which the person sacrificed would agree. In Scenario 3, we know that the potential sacrifice would choose to let the 5 others die rather than be sacrificed. Do you sacrifice him anyway?
This sounds very similar to the shock experiment where the doctor asks you to shock the patient while he records the results. 50% refused after the patient cried out in pain while th eother 50% kept following the doctor’s insturctions, basically feeling that the moral responsibility laid with the doctor, not themselves.
In this case scenario one can be viewed as the mad scientist has presented you with two options. He captured both groups of people and put them in harms way. He has now given you the choice of killing 1 or killing 5. Given that choice, it makes sense that most would choose 1.
In scenario 2 the fat man is an innocent bystander. By pushing him into harms way you have now added a wrong into the equation. In 1 you are choosing between someone elses 5 wrongs or their 1 wrong. In this case, you are adding your own wrong to hope to counter 5 wrongs.
You could follow up scenario 1 with this question. What if you knew for every American soldier on leave in your town that you murder, you could save 5 Iraqi/Afganistan civilians? If you have to, you can even insert a crystal ball that could tell you that our military’s actions in the Middle East would lead to no possitive benefit (hypotheticaly seaking). I’d be willing to bet that the numbers would be even lower.
In scenario two you are wronging an innocent bystander. In my new scenario you are trading the life of someone who risks his own life in the name of “good” in trade for a culture that is generaly seen as of lesser value than our own.
The real moral question comes with Scenario 3 where you would sacrifice someone knowing it was against their will. In Scenarios 1 and 2, many of us would rationalize our decisions as ones with which the person sacrificed would agree. In Scenario 3, we know that the potential sacrifice would choose to let the 5 others die rather than be sacrificed. Do you sacrifice him anyway?
He sounds like the kind of guy who passes a long line of merging traffic just to cut in at the last minute. We need fewer of them around.
He sounds like the kind of guy who passes a long line of merging traffic just to cut in at the last minute. We need fewer of them around.
Don’t you just hate that? What makes their time so much more valuable?
There are five people who are going to die in short order if your liver, kidneys, heart and lungs are not transplanted into them. They were exposed to some nasty chemicals through no fault of their own and are otherwise young, healthy, contributors to society. Do we sacrifice you and share your organs so that five can live? Are you willing to sacrifice yourself so that they can live?
I blocked in a car attempting to do just that last week. The line was nearly a mile long. You should’ve seen the hell the car next to her unleashed for the remainder of the time she was pinned in. One of the guys recorded it on his iphone for posterity. It’s probably floating around on youtube by now.
I have no obligation to five sick individuals, or even one sick child who’s not my own. If I were dying from another condition that was not affecting those organs, I would more than likely agree. Of course I’d have to consult with Julian first to get an official measure of Quality Adjusted Life Years and bill the families accordingly.
In scenario 2 the fat man is an innocent bystander. By pushing him into harms way you have now added a wrong into the equation. In 1 you are choosing between someone elses 5 wrongs or their 1 wrong. In this case, you are adding your own wrong to hope to counter 5 wrongs.
I have heard this explanation before but don’t agree with it. Do you? If so, can you explain it further?
The reason I don’t agree with it is that the results don’t change if the situation is all innocents with no “wrongs.”
***I have no obligation to five sick individuals, or even one sick child who’s not my own. If I were dying from another condition that was not affecting those organs, I would more than likely agree. Of course I’d have to consult with Julian first to get an official measure of Quality Adjusted Life Years and bill the families accordingly. ***
An act becomes more repugnant the more “real” it’s perceived to be especially when our sensory modes- smell, hearing, touch, acute sight- come into play.
That recalls the tragically comic quotation of Alfred Nobel: “My dynamite will sooner lead to peace than a thousand world conventions. As soon as men will find that in one instant, whole armies can be utterly destroyed, they surely will abide by golden peace.”