Prez Bush's Speech

[armytriguy]

Art, I simply don’t believe anything we do in Iraq is going to affect international terrorism. And I’m still waiting on the explanation on how 9/11 and Iraq are tied to each other, and how any stabilizing that country is going to eliminate our risk of another attack.

Here ya go.

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June 29, 2005, 9:12 a.m.
It’s All About 9/11
The president links Iraq and al Qaeda — and the usual suspects moan.

President George W. Bush forcefully explained last night — some of us would say finally forcefully explained

It was good to hear the commander-in-chief remind people that this is still the war against terror. Specifically, against Islamo-fascists who slaughtered 3000 Americans on September 11, 2001. Who spent the eight years before those atrocities murdering and promising to murder Americans — as their leader put it in 1998, all Americans, including civilians, anywhere in the world where they could be found.

It is not the war for democratization. It is not the war for stability. Democratization and stability are not unimportant. They are among a host of developments that could help defeat the enemy.

But they are not the primary goal of this war, which is to destroy the network of Islamic militants who declared war against the United States when they bombed the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, and finally jarred us into an appropriate response when they demolished that complex, struck the Pentagon, and killed 3000 of us on September 11, 2001.

That is why we are in Iraq.

On September 12, 2001, no one in America cared about whether there would be enough Sunni participation in a fledgling Iraqi democracy if Saddam were ever toppled. No one in lower Manhattan cared whether the electricity would work in Baghdad, or whether Muqtada al-Sadr’s Shiite militia could be coaxed into a political process. They cared about smashing terrorists and the states that supported them for the purpose of promoting American national security.

Saddam Hussein’s regime was a crucial part of that response because it was a safety net for al Qaeda. A place where terror attacks against the United States and the West were planned. A place where Saddam’s intelligence service aided and abetted al Qaeda terrorists planning operations. A place where terrorists could hide safely between attacks. A place where terrorists could lick their wounds. A place where committed terrorists could receive vital training in weapons construction and paramilitary tactics. In short, a platform of precisely the type without which an international terror network cannot succeed.

The president should know he hit the sweet spot during his Fort Bragg speech because all the right people are angry. The New York Times, with predictable disingenuousness, is railing this morning that the 9/11 references in the speech are out of bounds because Iraq had “nothing whatsoever to do with the terrorist attacks.” Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid and the tedious David Gergen, among others, are in Gergen’s words “offended” about use of the 9/11 “trump card.”

If the president is guilty of anything, it’s not that he’s dwelling on 9/11 enough. It’s that the administration has not done a good enough job of probing and underscoring the nexus between the Saddam regime and al Qaeda. It is absolutely appropriate, it is vital, for him to stress that connection. This is still the war on terror, and Iraq, where the terrorists are still arrayed against us, remains a big part of that equation.

And not just because every jihadist with an AK-47 and a prayer rug has made his way there since we invaded. No, it’s because Saddam made Iraq their cozy place to land long before that. They are fighting effectively there because they’ve been invited to dig in for years.

The president needs to be talking about Saddam and terror because that’s what will get their attention in Damascus and Teheran. It’s not about the great experiment in democratization — as helpful as it would be to establish a healthy political culture in that part of the world. It’s about making our enemies know we are coming for them if they abet and harbor and promote and plan with the people who are trying to kill us.

On that score, nobody should worry about anything the Times or David Gergen or Senator Reid has to say about all this until they have some straight answers on questions like these. What does the “nothing whatsoever” crowd have to say about:

Ahmed Hikmat Shakir — the Iraqi Intelligence operative who facilitated a 9/11 hijacker into Malaysia and was in attendance at the Kuala Lampur meeting with two of the hijackers, and other conspirators, at what is roundly acknowledged to be the initial 9/11 planning session in January 2000? Who was arrested after the 9/11 attacks in possession of contact information for several known terrorists? Who managed to make his way out of Jordanian custody over our objections after the 9/11 attacks because of special pleading by Saddam’s regime?

Saddam’s intelligence agency’s efforts to recruit jihadists to bomb Radio Free Europe in Prague in the late 1990’s?

Mohammed Atta’s unexplained visits to Prague in 2000, and his alleged visit there in April 2001 which — notwithstanding the 9/11 Commission’s dismissal of it (based on interviewing exactly zero relevant witnesses) — the Czechs have not retracted?

The Clinton Justice Department’s allegation in a 1998 indictment (two months before the embassy bombings) against bin Laden, to wit: In addition, al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.

Seized Iraq Intelligence Service records indicating that Saddam’s henchmen regarded bin Laden as an asset as early as 1992?

Saddam’s hosting of al Qaeda No. 2, Ayman Zawahiri beginning in the early 1990’s, and reports of a large payment of money to Zawahiri in 1998?

Saddam’s ten years of harboring of 1993 World Trade Center bomber Abdul Rahman Yasin?

Iraqi Intelligence Service operatives being dispatched to meet with bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998 (the year of bin Laden’s fatwa demanding the killing of all Americans, as well as the embassy bombings)?

Saddam’s official press lionizing bin Laden as “an Arab and Islamic hero” following the 1998 embassy bombing attacks?

The continued insistence of high-ranking Clinton administration officials to the 9/11 Commission that the 1998 retaliatory strikes (after the embassy bombings) against a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory were justified because the factory was a chemical weapons hub tied to Iraq and bin Laden?

Top Clinton administration counterterrorism official Richard Clarke’s assertions, based on intelligence reports in 1999, that Saddam had offered bin Laden asylum after the embassy bombings, and Clarke’s memo to then-National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, advising him not to fly U-2 missions against bin Laden in Afghanistan because he might be tipped off by Pakistani Intelligence, and “rmed with that knowledge, old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad”? (See 9/11 Commission Final Report, p. 134 & n.135.)

Terror master Abu Musab Zarqawi’s choice to boogie to Baghdad of all places when he needed surgery after fighting American forces in Afghanistan in 2001?

Saddam’s Intelligence Service running a training camp at Salman Pak, were terrorists were instructed in tactics for assassination, kidnapping and hijacking?

Former CIA Director George Tenet’s October 7, 2002 letter to Congress, which asserted:

Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.

We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda going back a decade.

Credible information indicates that Iraq and Al Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression.

Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of Al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad.

We have credible reporting that Al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to Al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.

Iraq’s increasing support to extremist Palestinians coupled with growing indications of relationship with Al Qaeda suggest that Baghdad’s links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action.

There’s more. Stephen Hayes’s book, The Connection, remains required reading. But these are just the questions; the answers — if someone will just investigate the questions rather than pretending there’s “nothing whatsoever” there — will provide more still.

So Gergen, Reid, the Times, and the rest are “offended” at the president’s reminding us of 9/11? The rest of us should be offended, too. Offended at the “nothing whatsoever” crowd’s inexplicable lack of curiosity about these ties, and about the answers to these questions.

Just tell us one thing: Do you have any good answer to what Ahmed Hikmat Shakir was doing with the 9/11 hijackers in Kuala Lampur? Can you explain it?

If not, why aren’t you moving heaven and earth to find out the answer?

[klehner]

Anyone who cites Atta’s visit to Prague as evidence of a 9/11-Iraq connection won’t allow facts to get in the way of his own agenda. The visit never took place, as has been acknowledged by everyone involved (except perhaps the Czech gov’t). A quick search found this summary: http://www.computerbytesman.com/911/praguefaq.htm

I didn’t bother to look past the first couple of points of (non-)evidence in your list. They were either irrelevant or incorrect. I did like this one from Tenent: “Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.” Are these the same detainees who are taught to disassemble?

[sandoval]

FOXNews? NRO? You guys need to get out more.

From http://billmon.org/archives/001955.html

Failure is an Option

The critical reaction to Bush’s speech – I’m talking here about the “respectable” establishment critics, not the antiwar left and right – seems to revolve around three points:

* Bush falsely tried to connect Iraq to 9/11.

* He lied when he said we have enough troops in Iraq.

* Failure in Iraq is not an option.

Unfortunately, all three statements are wrong. (Actually the second one, the bit about not having enough troops, is correct but also completely irrelevant. We don’t have any more troops to send, and Bush and his establishment critics both know this.)

It’s true, of course, that Bush shamelessly waved the bloody shirt of 9/11 in hopes (probably vain) of recovering his war president mojo. And we can sit around and make stupid jokes about Bush and fat jokes about Karl Rove and dream of the day when we can spit on both their graves for what they have done. Why not? It’s theraputic.

But it doesn’t change the fact that Bush has managed to make himself right at last: Iraq indeed has become the central front in the war against Al Qaeda (although the eastern front in Afghanistan is heating up quickly, and there’s always the risk of a breakthrough on the Southern front – Saudia Arabia – or the Western front – the Maghrib and/or Europe.)

But saying that Iraq is now the central front in the war on terrorism is neither an argument nor a strategy. At the moment, it’s pretty clear the Cheney administration and its pet military commanders don’t have a strategy, other than to pin their hopes on a political process that is going nowhere slowly, and that in any case is extremely unlikely to break the insurgency’s base of support – at least, not before it breaks the American volunteer army.

It’s not at all clear that sending more troops to Iraq would make the situation any better, even if it did marginally improve the Army’s ability to patrol Iraq’s 2,200 miles of borders.

The one thing everybody (save the most braindead dittoheads) agrees on is that the U.S. military has made itself enormously unpopular in Iraq – even among those who reluctantly accept the need for its presence. It’s hard to see how putting more jittery, haji-hating American soldiers on the streets of Iraq is going to help peel away the insurgency’s “soft support” or induce more Sunnis to cooperate with a government led by Shi’a fundamentalists.

However, without more troops, it seems inevitable that Iraq will continue to descend into chaos and (ultimately) something close to Hobbes’s war of the all against the all – a condition which may already be near at hand, according to Chris Allbritton of Back to Iraq 3.0:

News flash: Iraq is a disaster. I've been back one day, and the airport road was the worst I've ever seen it. We had to go around a fire-fight between mujahideen and Americans while Iraqi forces sat in the shade of date palms on the side of the road, their rifles resting across their laps.

It really does read like a scene from Full Metal Jacket:

Cowboy: Be glad to trade you some ARVN rifles. Never been fired and only dropped once.

It appears, then, that “staying the course” set by the Cheney administratration is likely to result in a completely failed state – or, from Al Qaeda’s point of view, an ideal state. The Pentagon, meanwhile, is stuck with the worst of both worlds – trying to fight a counterinsurgency campaign with a ground force that is far too small to pacify the country, but far too big (and visible) to avoid acting as the insurgency’s recruiting officers. Meanwhile, a hefty cut of whatever supplies or weapons are given to the Iraqi security forces are likely to end up in hostile hands – meaning the Army could wind up being the insurgency’s quartermaster corps as well.

To paraphrase Leonard, the psychotic Marine in Full Metal Jacket: We (or rather, our troops) appear to be in a world of shit.

Under the circumstances, the mindless chants of “failure is not an option” are starting to sound like the desperate prayers of the terminally ill. Failure is always an option – particularly for morons who launch a war of choice under the impression that they can’t possibly lose it.

Is the war hopelessly lost? I tend to think so, although I’m realistic enough to admit that I don’t have all the facts, and couldn’t interpret them all correctly even if I did. I know there are some military analysts whose opinions I respect who think the war is lost – analysts such as William S. Lind, who, for all his wing nuttery on cultural and social issues, is one smart cookie when it comes to “Fourth Generation” warfare:

"There's nothing that you can do in Iraq today that will work," said Lind, one of the original Fourth Generation Warfare authors. "That situation is irretrievably lost."

Even if Lind is wrong, it would seem rational and wise to plan for the eventuality that he may be right. (I know, I know: When has the Cheney administration ever been rational and wise about anything? But somebody should be thinking about these things.)

What’s the correct response, if the war in Iraq is indeed lost? It seems to me that planning would have to be done on the tactical, strategic and grand strategic levels.

I should add that I’m trying to look at this problem from a strictly realpolitik, amoral point of view – if not quite that of Henry Kissinger (God willing, I’ll never sink that low) then at least from the perspective of your typical realist think tanker. But I think I’d rather shoot myself in the head than be in a position where I actually had to put some of these ideas into practice.

Tactically, I suppose the logical emphasis would be on covering the retreat – i.e. preparing to withdraw in a way that maximizes the existing Iraqi government’s slender chances of survival and minimizes opportunities for Al Qaeda to exploit the situation.

I recently came across a proposal from Daniel Byman – a Georgetown U. professor and a member in good standing of the foreign policy elite – in which he suggests drawing down the number of U.S. troops to perhaps just one division, plus a reduced contingent of advisors and intelligence operatives. These would focus on training the Iraqi Army and security services, conducting covert ops (i.e. fighting the dirty war) and backing up Iraqi units if, or rather when, they got into serious trouble.

Now if you look at Byman’s plan as a strategy for victory, it’s pretty far-fetched – as even he admits. (He argues, sensibly, that it’s the least worst among the five options he lists, which range from dramatic escalation to immediate withdrawal.) But as the opening step in a phased retreat – one that hopefully avoids the helicopters on the roof of the embassy bit – it could make sense.

The next planning level is strategic, and here an analogy drawn from old-fashioned Third Generation warfare might be appropriate. Standard military doctrine holds that when the enemy breaks through your front – as, for example, at the Battle of the Bulge – the correct response is not to try to limit the depth of the penetration, but rather to shore up the shoulders on either side of the breakthrough. The objective is to constrict the enemy’s axis of advance and set the stage for counterattacks to pinch off and destroy the forces inside the salient.

A similar concept could be applied to failure in Iraq. The overriding U.S. objective should be to contain the damage by preventing chaos in Iraq from spilling over into the countries most seriously threatened by it – Saudia Arabia, Jordan and, ironically, Syria, which has its head in the lion’s jaws already. (I suspect, although I could be wrong, that Assad is playing footsie with the insurgency not so much to screw the Americans but to try to keep the jihadists focused on Iraq and not him.)

Realistically, this should mean more economic aid (at least for Jordan) more military and intelligence support (particularly for domestic security and border control) and less public haranguing about democracy – but more quiet encouragement of reform and dialogue, especially between the House of Saud and its Shi’a subjects in the oil regions. Policy towards Syria would also have to do a full 180, with economic sanctions lifted and complete cooperation with the Syrian security services on anti-terrorism matters.

That would definitely keep the White House propaganda shop busy with the Eurasia/Eastasia thing.

One huge benefit of a phased retreat from Iraq would be that it would restore the Army’s mobility – and thus the Pentagon’s freedom of action. This, in turn, would permit rapid, decisive intervention if critical tactical situations arose, either in Iraq or elsewhere. (Hypothetical examples might include the overthrow of an important Gulf sheihkdom or a major insurgent/terrorist infiltration into Saudi Arabia.)

Unchaining the Army from its Iraq boulder presumably would also make everyone, and particularly the Iranians, more cautious about provoking the hegemon – and thus less inclined to pursue adventurist policies in Iraq or elsewhere in the region.

But the Middle East isn’t a Third Generation battlefield, and the strategic equation is enormously complicated by the shifting interests of the Turks, the Iranians, the House of Saud, the Israelis, the Kurds, etc. It might very well be impossible to shore up one front without weakening the others, creating the risk of a “breakthrough” somewhere else.

The most serious threat, though, is that the neocons would use their newly regained freedom of action not to limit the fallout from failure in Iraq, but to invade Iran and/or Syria – the same “flight forward” response to crisis that ultimately ruined imperial Germany. And this is why, perversely, we probably should regard any sign that the Cheney administration is preparing to withdraw from Iraq as a warning flag of further catastrophes to come.

In other words: A sane, effective strategic response is probably impossible as long as the current gang remains in power. But you already knew that.

But the most important questions that need to be asked about the war on terrorism (and this was true even before 9/11) are on the grand strategic level. Grand strategy has been defined as the process by which nations articulate and pursue their core interests. Col. John Boyd, one of the great military thinker of the post World War II era, argued that grand strategy should focus on six key goals:

* Ensuring the nation's fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment.

* Strengthening national resolve and increasing internal political solidarity.

* Weakening the resolve of the nation's adversaries and reducing their internal cohesion.

* Reinforcing the commitments of our allies to our cause and making them empathetic to our success.

* Attracting the uncommitted to our cause.

* Ending conflicts on terms that do not sow the seeds for future conflicts.

These, of course, are precisely the areas where the Cheney administration’s failures have been most abject. But correcting those mistakes would require a far more sweeping re-examination of America’s involvement in the Middle East than our foreign policy elites and their media lapdogs will ever permit. Everything would have to be on the table: Our joined-at-the-hip alliance with Israel; our ravenous thirst for imported oil; our dirty little deals with the House of Saud and its U.S. retainers; our past and present complicity in torture and repression.

Most importantly, as soldier and scholar Andrew Bacevich has pointed out, it would require us to admit that the traditional thrust of U.S. foreign policy – the relentless drive to open the globe to American trade, American capital, American ideas and American values – has left us facing some hard questions, like:

How far is America willing to go to ensure the rest of the world adapts to its economic and cultural preferences?

And:

How does America reconcile its stated aspirations for “democracy” and “freedom” with its more prosaic needs for cheap oil, cheap labor and pliable regimes willing to guarantee our access to those things?

And, most importantly:

What do we do when we we encounter cultures – or large groups within those cultures – that refuse to accept or even negotiate over the terms we are offering?

At this point, Americans aren’t even willing to ask those questions, much less answer them. Which is why the most likely scenario is that failure in Iraq will be followed by further setbacks in the war on terrorism, as the neocons (or their neolib counterparts) stumble from one ill-conceived fiasco to another.

America may still win the war, someday, if only because of the tremendously powerful “soft” forces – globalization, consumerism, girls-just-wanna-have-fun-ism) working to its advantage. But that may not be much consolation if in the meantime a major American city has been converted into melted steel and glass, or biochem suits have become standard business attire. America can still “win” while losing what’s left of what’s good about this country. It’s slipping away already, with the Rovians as the undertakers, impatiently waiting to get their hands on the corpse.

So please, Mr. and Ms. Establishment Mouthpiece – spare us the chants of “failure is not an option.” We already know better. And you’re all the proof we need.

Posted by billmon at June 29, 2005 02:01 PM

[armytriguy]

That was but one of numerous examples and the 9/11 commission report documents it. Because there is a difference of belief as to whether Attah was there I do not think you can just summarily dismiss it as not true. Debateable yes. Do you believe the 9/11 report?

[ajfranke]

That is the problem, Ken. You won’t read. You won’t listen. The points you don’t read you are none the less quite certain are incorrect or irrelevant. You won’t connect the dots even when they overlap.

The terrorist flock to Iraq since they know if they lose there the dominoes will continue to fall and they will lose everywhere. This is not complicated.

There is plenty to criticize in any effort like this. A more constructive approach would be to offer an alternative strategy.

[adamb]

---

The terrorist flock to Iraq since they know if they lose there the dominoes will continue to fall and they will lose everywhere. This is not complicated.

How noble of us to choose the innocent citizens of Iraq as cannon fodder for the terrorists we wish to trap.

“You’re bait for madmen who will kill you by the thousands, now shower us with love and praise!”

[Former_User]

Citizens as cannon fodder? Please elaborate.

[klehner]

That was but one of numerous examples and the 9/11 commission report documents it. Because there is a difference of belief as to whether Attah was there I do not think you can just summarily dismiss it as not true. Debateable yes. Do you believe the 9/11 report?

Bob, here’s the 9/11 Report’s final word on the Prague meeting: "The available evidence does not support the original Czech report of an Atta-Ani meeting.70’

There is no “difference of belief.” Anyone who seriously studied the available data should know this. To include it in a list of supposed 9/11-Iraq links displays either ignorance or disengenuous. And, to answer Art, it shows a sloppiness that tells me that the rest is not worth reading.

[adamb]

---

Citizens as cannon fodder? Please elaborate.

If the idea of invading Iraq was to attract terrorists into Iraq for a showdown then we made the Iraqi citizens cannon fodder for the terrorists.

It’s really not complicated.

[Former_User]

Entering Iraq was not directly related to 9/11 but is part of the global effort on thwarting terrorist regimes throughout the world.

9/11 changed our policy on how we handle terrorism.

[Former_User]

If the idea of invading Iraq was to attract terrorists into Iraq for a showdown then we made the Iraqi citizens cannon fodder for the terrorists.

It’s really not complicated.

By that logic, no it’s not complicated. However your logic is flawed.

[ajfranke]

There are different versions as to whether the Atta meeting in Prague happened or not. Neither one of knows one way or the other.

To pick this one disputed item from the list and disregard everything else will prevent your preconceived conclusions from being challenged. How very safe of you. It reminds me of my 17 year old daughter.

[ajfranke]

Ken, just for fun here is an excerp from a Congressional resolution that all of your favorite Congressmen voted for:

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
.

[klehner]

There are different versions as to whether the Atta meeting in Prague happened or not. Neither one of knows one way or the other.

To pick this one disputed item from the list and disregard everything else will prevent your preconceived conclusions from being challenged. How very safe of you. It reminds me of my 17 year old daughter.
Fine. I read the rest of the list. It’s mostly irrelevant or nonsense. Happy?

[klehner]

Ken, just for fun here is an excerp from a Congressional resolution that all of your favorite Congressmen voted for:

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;
You know something? It’s wrong, and the congress-critters who voted for it will admit that it’s wrong, to associate Iraq and 9/11. At the time, they were led to believe there was a connection, but they all now (and will admit) that there is no connection.

[ajfranke]

Ken, those analyses were really deep. Thanks for the insight.

[Mike_Lamb]

how is his logic flawed? the intent might not have been to get iraqis caught in the cross fire, but that is most assuredly the effect. and we aren’t talking about something that wouldn’t have been foreseeable…

[Mookie1986]

“9/11 changed our policy on how we handle terrorism.”

Yeah, it was a great opportunity to use “terrorism” as a justification for all the expansionism of US power, and containment of anyone that challenges US preeminence, that the PNAC crowd was itching for. They were appalled that there might actually be a reduction in military spending, bases, and troops abroad, but fretted that Joe Average, suffering from Vietnam syndrome" and the naive belief that there must be some kind of peace dividend on the way with the end of the Cold War, wouldn’t buy a huge military buildup, wars with troops on the ground on multiple fronts, and dismantling of civil liberties without a catalyst - a “new Pearl Harbor.”

The introduction to the Project for the New American Century stated that the US “is the world’s only superpower, combining preeminent military power, global technological leadership and the world’s largest economy. At present the US faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible.” On how to maintain this “desirable strategic situation,” the report said the US “requires a globally preeminent military capability both today and in the future.”

In other words, unchallenged military, economic and political preeminence, or the Fleetwood Mac doctrine of “go your own way” and to hell with treaties, alliances, and constraints.

Well, 9/11 was just what the doctor ordered, and they didn’t waste a moment in springing to action.

The US State Department has long published lists of countries it considers soft on or supportive of terrorism. Coincidentally, they’ve always been countries that don’t tow the US line. But it was never enough to get support for ground wars against those countries, let alone carte blanche to define who’s evil and who’s a terrorist (usual suspects including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, North Korea and Cuba). After 9/11, the US administration moved quickly from targeting bin Laden specifically to declaring that it can go after terrorists and evildoers wherever and whenever it pleases.

Notice this progression and how Bush stretched things to try and cover the WMD claim so as to justify regime change in Iraq.

Nov. 21, 2001:
"America has a message for the nations of the world: if you harbor terrorists, you’re terrorists; if you train or arm a terrorist, you are a terrorist; if you feed or fund a terrorist, you’re a terrorist, and you will be held accountable by the United States and our friends’’ (and our poodles, too!).

Nov. 26, 2001:
“If they develop weapons of mass destruction that will be used to terrorise nations, they will be held accountable.”

Cui bono?

I have no doubt the crowd in power would love to face off with China, sooner than later. So much for all our latest bike ■■■■■

[klehner]

Ken, those analyses were really deep. Thanks for the insight.
Always glad to help.

[Former_User]

You watched Fahrenheit 9/11 didn’t you?