Oil Spill Liability Limit

I’ve been fuming ever since I first heard about the $75 million liability limit on damages resulting from oil spills. The law that was passed in the wake (no pun intended) of the Exxon spill represents typical collectivist policy–here not in the form of “spreading the wealth around,” but rather “spreading the expense around.” Each company is limited to a maximum of $75 million in damages, with any damages over that cap being paid out by a government-maintained Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, itself funded by a tax levied against all domestically produced oil.

In a true capitalist system, of course (and as I pointed out in an earlier thread), a company and its shareholders would be fully liable for all damages caused by that company’s actions. As a consequence, you can be sure that a company like BP would not simply have a backup plan for a contingency like this one, but also a backup plan in case the first backup plan failed, and most likely a backup plan to that one as well. Of course, companies could form voluntary agreements if they so chose to share the risk, but if they did so it would be in their interest to ensure that those agreements would include a managing authority that would enforce rigorous safety rules, backup plans, and procedures. (As an analogy, USAT won’t insure your race unless you adhere to a large number of safety-oriented rules.)

Under this socialized system, in contrast, a company like BP doesn’t have to worry too much about large-scale damages. Obviously, $75 million is small change to such a company in comparison with the enormous profits available from such ventures. Of course, the company’s public image will suffer somewhat, but public-relations managers can correct that problem easily enough by putting out a few more ads about BP’s commitment to alternative energy and to the environment. Meanwhile, should anyone really be surprised that the company was so woefully unprepared to contain this spill?

I’m on a Libertarian Party mailing list, and I just received an email that I think sums up the situation pretty well. An excerpt:
The New York Times has reported that federal law limits BP’s liability to $75 million, and Transocean’s liability to $65 million.
**
These kinds of artificial liability limits distort the markets, and basically create “moral hazard” by encouraging companies to act in riskier ways than they would otherwise. If BP’s well causes damage to property, then BP should be fully liable for all of the damage. It is BP’s reponsibility to “make whole” whoever gets damaged.
**
If Congress hadn’t limited BP’s liability, it’s likely that BP would have acted differently. Knowing that a spill could cost them billions, BP might have demanded additional safeguards for their well, or tested their safeguards more thoroughly. These choices would have been expensive, but they might have prevented the huge costs that the spill area is now facing.
**
BP has said that it will pay all “legitimate claims,” even if they go past the liability limit. The problem is that when it comes to property damage, a court should decide what “legitimate claims” are, not the offending company!
**
Of course, now we’re likely to see a flurry of reactive legislation, as members of Congress try to pile on BP for political reasons. And, Congress will probably use the spill as an excuse to increase its market interference and shovel more subsidies into uneconomical “alternative energy.”
**
(It’s possible that if energy companies did not have the benefits of artificial liability limits, the market might decide that some alternative energy would be cost effective. But that’s for the free market to decide, not Congress using taxpayer subsidies.)
**
As the Libertarian Party platform says, “Free markets and property rights stimulate the technological innovations and behavioral changes required to protect our environment and ecosystems.”

Sadly, this is yet another of government getting involved in something and mucking things up (remember, the gov’t developed an emergency response plan > 10 years ago, they just weren’t ready to deploy it last month, go figure). This is another example of corporatism, which is socialism’s evil step-brother.

The legitimate damages in this case will mostly likely be in the billions, if the company were truly liable, the board would have a fiduciary obligation manage the executives in a way to mitigate that risk.

Nice post. I love it when people unhinge fundamental components of a free market and then talk about its failure to work properly.

Let BP pay the true cost of this oil spill. They will pass that cost on to the consumer. When we are all paying that price, I suspect clean, alternative energy sources will be much more appealing. A free market will bring alternative energy sources to fruition far faster than Uncle Sam has.
Put another way, “I think we have had quite enough regulation and I think we need some true capitalism now.”

I agree with you, they screwed up and if found liable in the cases, they should pay for it.

If it puts them OoB, so be it. If you know your risk side is alot lower than the upside and you are not guided by a responsbile compass, then I think they feel little to lose in the long run.

“Let BP pay the true cost of this oil spill. They will pass that cost on to the consumer. When we are all paying that price, I suspect clean, alternative energy sources will be much more appealing.”

Possibly. Or possibly it might turn out that companies could develop truly safe ways of conducting offshore drilling. In the absence of a truly free market, where property rights are fully enforced and competitors are therefore held fully liable for all their costs, no one can really know for certain which solution (or maybe some combination) is the most cost-effective. At work here is a principle familiar to modern economists: The free market isn’t just a way of producing goods and services, but also the generator of economic information.

Rob - What this law does is essentially provide publicly funded insurance in excess of $75 million per occurrence. Not too dissimilar to the publicly funded deposit insurance for bank accounts.

The alternative is a free market system which would provide private insurance (or if no private insurer were willing to provide coverage for a marketable price) a self-retained risk for oil companies. Now, if we ended up with a self-retained risk, how deeply capitalized do you think these companies would be? They would spin off the riskiest operations to undercapitalized corporations and declare them bankrupt in the event of a catastrophe such as this.

Now, $75 million seems a bit light as far as retained liability under the legislation but the legislative scheme is not a bad one.

Isnt this spill in International Waters? If it is more than 13miles off shore I would tell Obama and the US to pound sand if I was BP. Fact is the US needs BP more than BP needs the US.

Each company is limited to a maximum of $75 million in damages, with any damages over that cap being paid out by a government-maintained Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, itself funded by a tax levied against all domestically produced oil.

I don’t really see the issue here. So oil companies have been paying additional taxes into a trust fund for 20+ years in order to fund cleanup of a future spill. Now that the spill has happened, you are taking issue with the taxes that have been paid into the fund being used to pay for the cleanup.

I have serious doubts that the oil companies were lobbying for additional taxes back when the trust fund was established. It was congress that decided to get involved in this and establish the law. It wasn’t the evil oil companies. You can’t have it both ways. The government can either tax them and then get involved, or not tax them and then require them to pay 100% of the cost.

There is a 200 mile limit for commerical activities like oil drilling so the area is still under US control, the US owns the mineral righs and leased them to BP. BP answers to the US.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea

Since we (the US) own the oil and we can get anyone to drill for it. If they are successful, they get to sell it and we get a cut (royalty). We’re no different than a rancher in Texas that owns the mineral rights under his ranch. Its ours and we have 100% say over who gets to drill for it. We decided to grant a lease to BP but we can pick someone else to drill for our oil. We don’t need BP.

So oil companies have been paying additional taxes into a trust fund for 20+ years in order to fund cleanup of a future spill.


Actually, it is the consumers who have been paying the taxes. Unless you somehow think that companies do not pass such taxes, levies, fees, etc. on to consumers in the prices of their products. Otherwise, I agree with your post.

The nuclear industry has a limited liability for accidents as well, with all providers paying into the fund each year. That is backstopped by good ole Uncle Sam…mostly because insuring a nuclear plant is really, really pricey, and we likely wouldn’t have a “peaceful” nuclear industry without liability limits.

Rob - What this law does is essentially provide publicly funded insurance in excess of $75 million per occurrence. Not too dissimilar to the publicly funded deposit insurance for bank accounts.

The alternative is a free market system which would provide private insurance (or if no private insurer were willing to provide coverage for a marketable price) a self-retained risk for oil companies. Now, if we ended up with a self-retained risk, how deeply capitalized do you think these companies would be? They would spin off the riskiest operations to undercapitalized corporations and declare them bankrupt in the event of a catastrophe such as this.

Now, $75 million seems a bit light as far as retained liability under the legislation but the legislative scheme is not a bad one.

Isn’t a big difference between this and the FDIC is that the FDIC is basically insuring the money that I or you put into a bank. I don’t see the analogy as applicable in the case of an oil spill or, as you put it, insurance to cover damages from an oil spill.

I’d also add that I agree with Rob that no limit would produce best practices in terms of safety (there were a number of safety devices available that were not in place in this instance). Do you think that BP would be lobbying against heightened safety regs if they weren’t limited in their damages?

Each company is limited to a maximum of $75 million in damages, with any damages over that cap being paid out by a government-maintained Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, itself funded by a tax levied against all domestically produced oil.

I don’t really see the issue here. So oil companies have been paying additional taxes into a trust fund for 20+ years in order to fund cleanup of a future spill. Now that the spill has happened, you are taking issue with the taxes that have been paid into the fund being used to pay for the cleanup.

I have serious doubts that the oil companies were lobbying for additional taxes back when the trust fund was established. It was congress that decided to get involved in this and establish the law. It wasn’t the evil oil companies. You can’t have it both ways. The government can either tax them and then get involved, or not tax them and then require them to pay 100% of the cost.

The problem is all of the kvetching about taxes. And as Brick noted, it’s quite easy to build the cost for capitalizing this fund into the cost of the oil, so the bottom line isn’t really affected. I started a thread about this earlier–as long as the gov’t will subsidize losses, I am all for taxing the heck out of oil companies, including limiting profits.

Isn’t a big difference between this and the FDIC is that the FDIC is basically insuring the money that I or you put into a bank. I don’t see the analogy as applicable in the case of an oil spill or, as you put it, insurance to cover damages from an oil spill.


The point is that the federal government is insuring your deposits against a failure by the bank. In other words, you are protected from a bank’s failure, negligence, malfeasance, etc. up to a particular amount. In a similar fashion, the public is protected from BP’s negligence by the trust fund established to pay claims. It is a legislatively enforced savings account for such disasters. It is designed to protect the public … not BP.

I’d also add that I agree with Rob that no limit would produce best practices in terms of safety (there were a number of safety devices available that were not in place in this instance). Do you think that BP would be lobbying against heightened safety regs if they weren’t limited in their damages?


And you would be wrong. BP would set up a marginally capitalized corporate entity to perform the drilling. When the shit hits the fan, the company declares bankruptcy and everyone is SOL. There would still be plenty of lobbying against regulations without a liability cap. It happens in every industry without liability caps.

One would think I would know that as my ‘real’ father own an oil explortation company - thanks for pointing that out.

And yes, we COULD do it with out BP…but my fathers as well as many other US based oil companies have not been able to do business in the US or in its waters thanks to US regulations - thus they are now HQ’ed out of Jakarta and do all of their drilling in South America and African waters. They would LOVE to come back to the US and the Gulf of Mexico…it is far too cost prohibitive however (and companies like BP/Exxon have all of the contracts).

Rob - What this law does is essentially provide publicly funded insurance in excess of $75 million per occurrence. Not too dissimilar to the publicly funded deposit insurance for bank accounts.

The alternative is a free market system which would provide private insurance (or if no private insurer were willing to provide coverage for a marketable price) a self-retained risk for oil companies. Now, if we ended up with a self-retained risk, how deeply capitalized do you think these companies would be? They would spin off the riskiest operations to undercapitalized corporations and declare them bankrupt in the event of a catastrophe such as this.

Now, $75 million seems a bit light as far as retained liability under the legislation but the legislative scheme is not a bad one.

Isn’t a big difference between this and the FDIC is that the FDIC is basically insuring the money that I or you put into a bank. I don’t see the analogy as applicable in the case of an oil spill or, as you put it, insurance to cover damages from an oil spill.

I’d also add that I agree with Rob that no limit would produce best practices in terms of safety (there were a number of safety devices available that were not in place in this instance). Do you think that BP would be lobbying against heightened safety regs if they weren’t limited in their damages?

How about a hybrid of the two? Develop a sound set of practices that would allow safe drilling and if the oil companies don’t follow these practices the $75 million limit does not apply.

I don’t understand the argument that this fund is designed to primarily to protect the public. How does limiting BP’s financial liability protect the public? Unless by “protect the public” you mean insuring cheap gas, because that what it is mostly about. Yes, I understand that it is in the public’s best interest to have funds for a clean up of a spill. In my opinion, however, you should force BP to expend every and all resource before the public foots the bill. Alternatively, the gov’t cleans up the mess and presents the entire bill to BP on behalf of the public. If BP ends up in bankruptcy, oh well.

**Now, $75 million seems a bit light as far as retained liability under the legislation but the legislative scheme is not a bad one. **

Some limit on liability coupled with a fund all producers pay into to share the risk is not a bad concept but $75,000,000 is rediculously low. That amount is only 4 months production on the 10,000 bbl a day this well is expected to produce once they get it under control. To put that in perspective, most individuals carry auto insurance policy limits equal to 3 - 5 years of their income.

Wells aren’t going to be at risk of big spills if they are not going to end up being good producers (ie no oil = no spill) so in most cases, you are not even going to have a spill without the ability to rake in some real money after you get the thing fixed. In that sense, spills from wells are a whole different animal than tanker spills. The damage cap for well blowouts should be calculated based on a sliding scale based on production rates.

Actually, a good addition to the bill that will inevitably be introduced to raise the liablility limit will be some penatlies for spills like this such as a ban on bidding on leases for a period of time or, better yet, a dramatic increase in the royalty payment rate for a few years. Let them keep the well but we (taxpayers) get 75% of the proceeds for X years as inspiration to be more careful. If we collected even just 50% of the produciton from this well for 1 year as a fine, it would be about $215 million.

Rob - What this law does is essentially provide publicly funded insurance in excess of $75 million per occurrence. Not too dissimilar to the publicly funded deposit insurance for bank accounts.

The alternative is a free market system which would provide private insurance (or if no private insurer were willing to provide coverage for a marketable price) a self-retained risk for oil companies. Now, if we ended up with a self-retained risk, how deeply capitalized do you think these companies would be? They would spin off the riskiest operations to undercapitalized corporations and declare them bankrupt in the event of a catastrophe such as this.

Now, $75 million seems a bit light as far as retained liability under the legislation but the legislative scheme is not a bad one.

Isn’t a big difference between this and the FDIC is that the FDIC is basically insuring the money that I or you put into a bank. I don’t see the analogy as applicable in the case of an oil spill or, as you put it, insurance to cover damages from an oil spill.

I’d also add that I agree with Rob that no limit would produce best practices in terms of safety (there were a number of safety devices available that were not in place in this instance). Do you think that BP would be lobbying against heightened safety regs if they weren’t limited in their damages?

How about a hybrid of the two? Develop a sound set of practices that would allow safe drilling and if the oil companies don’t follow these practices the $75 million limit does not apply.

Current negligence law is functionally a hybrid. The standard is what would a reasonably prudent oil company in BP’s place have done re: safety devices/procedures. If it met the duty of care, liability is limited (if any at all).

Isn’t a big difference between this and the FDIC is that the FDIC is basically insuring the money that I or you put into a bank. I don’t see the analogy as applicable in the case of an oil spill or, as you put it, insurance to cover damages from an oil spill.


The point is that the federal government is insuring your deposits against a failure by the bank. In other words, you are protected from a bank’s failure, negligence, malfeasance, etc. up to a particular amount. In a similar fashion, the public is protected from BP’s negligence by the trust fund established to pay claims. It is a legislatively enforced savings account for such disasters. It is designed to protect the public … not BP.

I’d also add that I agree with Rob that no limit would produce best practices in terms of safety (there were a number of safety devices available that were not in place in this instance). Do you think that BP would be lobbying against heightened safety regs if they weren’t limited in their damages?


And you would be wrong. BP would set up a marginally capitalized corporate entity to perform the drilling. When the shit hits the fan, the company declares bankruptcy and everyone is SOL. There would still be plenty of lobbying against regulations without a liability cap. It happens in every industry without liability caps.

I’d also add that marginally capitalizing a company that is there as pretty much a liability shield would allow attorneys to pierce the corporate veil and get after the parent company pretty quickly…