New Iraq policy

I heard a report on NBC that President Bush’s strategy for Iraq, to be announced next week will be called “Surge and Accelerate” (we need a new slogan, right).

It will call for an additonal 20,000 troops to “secure” Baghdad, and then accelerate the training of Iraqi soldiers.

Sounds like a solid plan.

Those 3 hours last week will be paying off big dividends.


I’m just curious where the 20,000 are coming from and why they weren’t there when Bagdad fell.

Though that is a moot point unless we recently developed a time machine. I only hope this isn’t too little, too late. No matter what your policy (or party) of choice is, I hope for the best.

There will likely be a general mobilization of the reserves to include the Inactive Ready Reserve, of which I am a member (for 4 more months). So far we’ve only had a selective mob, meaning individual units are called up and sent overseas. A general mob will recall them all and enable the POTUS to deploy them as long as he wants. A general mob will also stop loss all soldiers, active or inactive, disallowing exit from the military, retirement, etc. So, basically, anyone who volunteered to serve the great country is about to get screwed for it.

I’m just curious where the 20,000 are coming from and why they weren’t there when Bagdad fell.


That’s a good point but of course, we didn’t think ahead in regards to what we do after we topple the statue in Baghdad. Why would we need soldiers, other than to pick up all the flowers the Iraqis would be throwing at us is I suppose, the thinking behind it at the time.

My question is why we think throwing more soldiers in one area will do any good. We have had almost 4 years of experience there and still don’t quite get the fact that we are the problem, not the solution.

On another note, I watched the Frontline show on the build up to Iraq last night and think Dick Cheney should not only be forced to step down as V.P., but a good case could be made for him to go to jail.

That’s a good point but of course, we didn’t think ahead in regards to what we do after we topple the statue in Baghdad. Why would we need soldiers, other than to pick up all the flowers the Iraqis would be throwing at us is I suppose, the thinking behind it at the time.


Well…the thinking of those who were calling the shots.

We aren’t the only country in the last 50 years who’ve made the mistake of expecting technology to trump man power. I can’t remember the specific military action, but not too long ago the Soviets made the mistake of trying to secure an area with tanks.

Like I said, I wish everyone the best. Believe me, I’ve got family going over there that I wish were not. But if they are their then I hope its with good support.

There will likely be a general mobilization of the reserves to include the Inactive Ready Reserve, of which I am a member (for 4 more months).

That is not even funny, I retired 7 months ago.
Seriously, I think this administration has done more to harm the long term health of the military than any other in a generation (or two). Most folks in my unit are 20 and out or one term and out. The amount of mid and long term experience that the military is losing is incredible.

They are moving up the timeline on many future deployments as well. Without going into specifics a few units I know of have had their deployment dates moved up 3-6 months.

It will call for an additonal 20,000 troops to “secure” Baghdad, and then accelerate the training of Iraqi soldiers.

I have yet to hear anybody explain why another 20,000 troops will suffice to secure Baghdad. (Assuming, of course, that we can even send another 20,000 troops- actual combat troops- to Iraq. Last I heard, we were still short on a lot of key gear. How are these new guys going to be equipped?)

As for “accelerating” the training of Iraqi soldiers, that is a big, fat joke. We have been talking about speeding up Iraqi military/security readiness almost since the beginning. “We’re going to help them stand up, so we can stand down,” and all that nonsense. What, we were just joshing about it up until now?

The fact is that technical training/competence of the Iraqi army is not the big problem. The problem with the Iraqi army is cultural- they don’t have the professional ethos that the US military has developed. And they’re not going to develop it any time soon, either. That kind of things takes years to build up, in the best case scenario, if you’re lucky enough to be able to base it on existing cultural values. We aren’t that lucky in Iraq, and it isn’t a best case scenario.

If this was a serious plan, Bush would offer some sort of timeline to go along with it- whether it was six months, six years, or twenty six years. If, in other words, it was a real plan, he’s be able to say, “We’re going to surge the troops for two years, during which time we expect to be able to stand up the Iraqi army once and for all. Once they’re fully capable, we will begin a drawdown.” Or something like that. But there’s not going to be a timeline, because it isn’t a serious plan.

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I have yet to hear anybody explain why another 20,000 troops will suffice to secure Baghdad.


I think in the same way 130,000 were sufficient to secure Iraq.

I guess you really can fool some of the people all of the time.

If this was a serious plan, Bush would offer some sort of timeline to go along with it- whether it was six months, six years, or twenty six years. If, in other words, it was a real plan, he’s be able to say, “We’re going to surge the troops for two years, during which time we expect to be able to stand up the Iraqi army once and for all. Once they’re fully capable, we will begin a drawdown.” Or something like that. But there’s not going to be a timeline, because it isn’t a serious plan.

You mean, like, deliverables? Milestones? Planning? We don’t need no steenkin’ plans.

The current Administration plan can be summarized thusly: “Hope for a miracle”.

Not much evidence to support your point. Despite a good economy, pepole are staying in in droves, apparently: Retention
The Army announced that the active-duty Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve exceeded Fiscal Year 2006 retention goals for the year.
• The active-duty Army closed the fiscal year at 105 percent of its retention mission. The goal was to re-enlist 64,200 Soldiers and 67,410 Soldiers actually reenlisted.
• The Army Reserve closed out fiscal year 2006 at 103 percent of its retention mission, with 18,243 Soldiers reenlisting. The goal was to retain 17,712 Soldiers.
• The Army National Guard finished 2006 at 118 percent. The Guard reenlisted 41,152 Soldiers, surpassing its goal by 6,277.


Actually, force structure plans only call for about 35 to 40% of first term enlistees to stay in anyway. There aren’t enough E-5 and up billets or enough MP dollars to support more than that. Reportedly, combat units have among the highest numbers. It’s the REMFs that want out, apparently.

It’s the REMFs that want out, apparently.

Nice, glad you support our troops, all of them.
My comments are from my observations and conversations with peers in other units. Retention and manning levels are being met but the numbers appear to be somewhat misleading. More folks are 20 and out and other reenlistments seemed to be highly influenced by record high bonuses that are being offered. The depth of experience in the military appears to be eroding. I could be wrong but those are my observations. My biggest domestic concern while I was in was how we were going to recruit and retaining the best and the brightest.

Sorry tri-bri, but your numbers are skewed. Those figures include units deployed as well as those deploying who are under stop loss orders. Its easy to retain folks when you don’t let them leave. If re-enlistment is where it should be then why is the Army re-calling the IRR, forcing Navy folks to drive convoys, and offering a blue to green option to the Air Force? Surely you’ve done enough USR reports to know how we fudge numbers in the Army, you need to look at unit level to see the truth.

As for the REMFs leaving comment; unfortunately its those REMFs that are the most needed right now. Every Ranger I know that has been called back in is doing decidedly un-Infantry activities like CA and MiTT. There’s a reason huge bonuses are being thrown at the REMFs and not the line dogs.

I know full well that Soldiers will line up to re-enlist during wartime. But unfortunatley, repetative deployments wear them down and they leave at exactly the point when we need them most: E-5 to E-8 and O-3 to O-5. We might be putting more lower enlisted in, but mid level NCOs and Officers are leaving in droves.

The fact is that technical training/competence of the Iraqi army is not the big problem. The problem with the Iraqi army is cultural- they don’t have the professional ethos that the US military has developed. And they’re not going to develop it any time soon, either. That kind of things takes years to build up, in the best case scenario, if you’re lucky enough to be able to base it on existing cultural values. We aren’t that lucky in Iraq, and it isn’t a best case scenario.


The problem stems back to the drawing up of seemingly arbitrary borders that put tribes and religious sects that never wanted to be part of the same country in the first place.

I once read that culturaly Iraqi’s don’t have loyalty to their country, they have loyalty to their religion/tribe. To put Kurds, Sunis, and Shias in th esame unit would be the equivalent of putting plantation owners and slaves in the same units after the fall of the Confederacy.

It is really just one big mess. Too bad we can’t put the original army back together.

In response to several of the above posts–FWIW.

The Iraqi unit I advised last year worked smack in the middle of “the triangle,” and was composed of an almost perfect mix of Sunni/Shii. Their colonel used to tell his men and officers repeatedly that–“we are not Sunni; we are not Shii; we are Iraqi.” They performed quite well in combat once we got them trained up. I submit that you DONT want the old brutal Iraqi Army back–it was a blunt instrument in every sense of the word and totally incapable of any possibility at fighting the type of war we’re now trying to get this new IA stood up and executing well. Our IA were able to conduct Cordon and Search on Sunni and Shii villages with a minimum of complaints about harassment, thievery, secular violence (we did have some but the chain of command quashed it immediately). Are there ethnic tensions–yes; are there shii/sunni tensions–yes; are there tribal tensions–yes; are there political tensions–yes; given all that this battalion went out onto the battlefield and did quite well at counter-insurgency type OPS. IMO the real challenge with the IA is at brigade Hq level and above (extremely political and tactically incapable). It is a LOT harder to train a brigade staff to functional level than it is a battalion—and it gets even harder/more complex at division. Also, the supporting services (man,move, arm, equip, repair) are harder to build to sufficient functionality than their infantry brethern. The IA combat units are pretty much competent and equipped (minimally enough) at the lower end of the tactical level (platoon, company, and battalion). But a bunch of light/wheeled infantry battalions does not an Army make. The combat service support will take longer and we’re working at that. Replacing the culture of the old Iraqi Army with one more comparable to ours is also a very tough work in progress.

Well before OEF and OIF there was a retention problem in some segments in our (US) Army–mainly with combat arms O3s (captains). At the pre-command course for brigade/battalion command the Chief of Staff of the Army–then GEN Shinseki–came to Leavenworth and talked to us about the issue, and personally challenged us to work harder at retaining our combat arms captains. As for career officers leaving right at year 20? Don’t know a lot about that–I didn’t but I’m a data factor of one. It’s just my opinion but I think we’ve got enough INF LTCs to go around–lol. We do need more INF CPTs/E7s/E8s. There are tremendous stresses on our Soldiers and their families right now. Due to the wonders of modern technology (internet and cell phone) those stresses can be brought right to the Soldier inside his dirty little FOB. Again–it was GEN Shinseki that warned Congress to beware “the 12 Division strategy with a 10 Division Army.” But we (the people) wanted our peace dividend and we got it. The operational tempo is insane and the way the Army is going to generate these extra 20K Soldiers is by curtailing their one year at home station and redeploying them back to OIF early. Meanwhile we (the Army) are striping our schools and training centers and minimally manning them (increasing class sizes-student to teacher/drill sergeant ratios) in an effort to man MiTTs and SPTTs–so we are eating our seed corn as it were. Our (US) Army answers to its political leaders–and now that Rumsfeld is gone some of the generals–led by the current Chief–are finally being allowed speak out publicly about these pressures and issues. Prior to this it was only the retired GOs that could speak out–and only a handful chose to do so. Now that these stresses and issues are finally getting out into public domain the people can “see” the issues and inform our political leaders what they want done with our (US) Army. Is the sky falling–nope; is the (US ) Army broken–nope; is the situation hopeless–nope. But some key decisions gotta get made cause the machine is operating at maximum capacity and the needle is creeping towards the red line; somethings gonna give sooner or later if we don’t make some key decisions soon here.

Steve, I have been a critic of Iraq since before it began but I would like to ask a question to get your honest perspective.

In almost 4 years now, President Bush has been saying he would increase the troops only if the Commanders on the ground asked for it. There is ample evidence now that they indeed did ask for more troops but were largely ignored. Let’s put that aside for now.

The Iraqi study group comes out and is supporting a withdrawl of some sort.

Now, the President is about to increase the troops by probably 20,000 despite the Commanders on the ground saying this is a mistake.

It seems to be that it is completely out of character for Bush to request 20,000 troops because,
It is a half-measure. 20,000 is not enough to crush the insurgency (since 130,000 has had little effect) and yet it is too many for the many Americans looking to get out. The Commanders on the ground are saying that adding more troops will just increase the Iraqi dependency on us, in other words, we are not giving them the responsibility for their own security.
So, why is he doing this? He is ignoring the wise advice of the study group and appears to be acting out of desperation with no real plan or objective in mind. What would the 20,000 additional troops be able to accomplish what 130,000 have not been able to do in almost 4 years?

What is the feeling on the ground?

I thought Surge and Accelerade were beverages? One featuring caffeine and sugar, and the other just lots of sugar. =)

To be serious, and to try to be fair, is thre ANY strategy that would make “a lof sense” AND address all of the concerns on varius aspects to be “successful” in our goals for Iraq to be self-sufficiant in terms of government, framework, and military?

I’m trying to think of any strategy that wouldn’t be met with the phrase, “that won’t work”.

Why would we need soldiers, other than to pick up all the flowers the Iraqis would be throwing at us is I suppose, the thinking behind it at the time.

Note to Self: Never cross or disappoint Casey. =)

I do want to compliment on your sarcasm, pink or otherwise.

The problem stems back to the drawing up of seemingly arbitrary borders that put tribes and religious sects that never wanted to be part of the same country in the first place.

I read an article (awhile ago) and talked about it here (in the LR) that was written by the grandson of the man that developed and executed the plan to draw boundaries in the middle east. It was written from an English perspective and essentially said, “You guys are getting ready to make the same mistake we did a long time ago.” I thought it was interesting.

“IMO the real challenge with the IA is at brigade Hq level and above (extremely political and tactically incapable).”

I completely agree with you here. I’m Navy, not Army, but I’ve been involved in a lot of training missions for various countries in various mission areas, and the problems we had were never on a tactical unit level. None of the basic principles that are required for tactical success are all that complex, and the small unit leadership issues can be overcome with strong personalities. The challenges at a strategic level are far more complicated, and the challenges of integrating multiple units together under some form of civilian leadership are complex on an order of magnitude more.