I thought this article had several good points in it…sorry for the length.
New York Times
September 20, 2005
An Honest Victory
By Nathaniel Fick
Cambridge, Mass.-- Authority can be delegated; responsibility cannot. President Bush’s speech last week accepting responsibility for the federal government’s slow response to Hurricane Katrina was commendable, if overdue. Though it has been derided by some as political expediency, the president’s acknowledgment was a necessary first step in rebuilding the Gulf Coast and preparing for the next disaster.
This new transparency, however, shouldn’t stop with Hurricane Katrina. Consider the positive effects that would follow a similar presidential assumption of responsibility for American missteps in Iraq.
By declaring that the buck stops at his desk, President Bush could begin a top-down rethinking of our military and political strategies since the 2003 invasion. He would also establish a standard of personal accountability for everyone in the chain of command, much as his statement last week prompted Gov. Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana to follow suit. And it just might galvanize enough bipartisan support to break the ideological gridlock that has limited changes in Iraq policy to marginal tweaks rather than a full reassessment.
Of course, many people we will depend on in our attempt to rebuild Iraq - including Iraqi civilians, nongovernmental aid organizations and our foreign allies - will respond only to results, not to rhetoric. There is, however, at least one group that would respond well to this particular piece of rhetoric: senior military leaders. The fate of Gen. Eric Shinseki, the former Army chief of staff who fell into disfavor with the White House after telling Congress in 2003 that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq, has cast a long shadow across the officer corps.
Much of the military’s trustworthiness derives from its culture of accountability. In 1944, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower prepared a speech in case the D-Day invasion failed, knowing that his continued leadership of the Army depended on taking responsibility for its shortcomings. Half a century later, my own Marine training stressed that I, as a commander, was responsible for everything my troops did, or failed to do.
Senior military officers rightly expect the same sense of responsibility from the elected government they serve. The tradition of providing apolitical advice based on sound military judgment is predicated on the willingness of civilian leaders to consider unpopular counsel, something this administration has been unwilling to do. An admission of responsibility from the top would give our commanders new freedom to analyze what has gone wrong in Iraq and to work with the Pentagon’s civilians to improve it, translating presidential rhetoric into results on the ground.
While our mistakes have been many - from broad policy to specific tactics - the most frustrating are those that recur. Many of the problems I witnessed in Iraq two years ago are being repeated: the three enablers of insurgency - weapons, men and money - still flow freely from Syria and Iran; many American units are still blind to cultural nuance, largely because of a shortage of translators; and there’s still too much focus on the misleading statistic of dead insurgents, as if the enemy were finite.
As things stand, American citizens - and the military - have been offered a false choice between “staying the course” in Iraq and precipitous withdrawal. The historian James Chace compared the former to a sailor who, having been blown off course in a storm, continues to sail straight ahead, but in the wrong direction. Cutting and running, on the other hand, isn’t a strategy. A hasty exit would give us anarchy, civil war and maybe revenge killing on a scale unseen since Rwanda. That withdrawal is frequently advanced as the “humanitarian” option is appalling. There must be a third way.
Enter presidential leadership. Envision this: In a primetime address like last Thursday’s, President Bush focuses the power of his office on Iraq. He doesn’t claim that we have turned a corner or that the insurgents are fighting harder because they are weaker. He speaks honestly, acknowledges the administration’s mistakes, accepts responsibility for them and explains why creating a stable Iraq is in America’s national interest. Then, and this is the key, he announces a reassessment of American strategy spanning from the roles of the commander in chief to the lowliest private.
We are not talking about shifting a few thousand troops from one city to another. President Bush would have to condone a major philosophical and strategic shift away from what hasn’t worked. Fortunately, there are leaders in the military who understand counterinsurgency warfare. Conventional armies have been fighting guerrillas since ancient times, and this history offers countless cautionary examples, from Masada to Malaya. The nearest thing to a universal maxim is that counterinsurgents who fail to see their mistakes and to adapt on the fly are doomed to lose.
The military has proved itself adaptable in Iraq. Robots now zap roadside bombs with jolts of electricity and microwave energy. Junior officers and noncommissioned officers now post accounts of the hard lessons they’ve learned on military Web sites for quick dissemination to their peers. Soldiers and marines now return for second and third tours, armed with a better sense of the landscape, geographic and cultural. But these better methods will not become standard across Iraq unless the president himself encourages the military to undergo strategic adaptation. Officers must be granted authority to change course by the person who bears ultimate responsibility for the outcome.
There’s no shortage of good alternatives waiting in the wings. One that has recently garnered much attention is the military historian Andrew Krepinevich’s “oil spot” strategy, which involves shifting the focus from killing insurgents to protecting civilians by pouring money and manpower into protected cantons where average Iraqis can see the tangible advantages of our system over Al Qaeda’s.
The particulars of whatever strategy we decide to go with are, at this point, secondary. First, commitment to change must be made, and quickly. The federal government came under assault for a delay of days in its response to Hurricane Katrina. Each week’s delay in Iraq costs about a dozen Americans dead, a hundred wounded and a billion dollars down the drain, plus vast harm to American prestige and the Iraqis themselves.
President Bush has the power to change the United States’ prospects in Iraq. But doing so requires the courage to admit errors, and the willingness to embrace good ideas. A break with the past can be Hurricane Katrina’s positive legacy.Nathaniel Fick, a former Marine captain who led infantry platoons in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the author of “One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer.”