I’m sure by now that lots of folks have heard of the progress being made in Anbar province with Iraqi sheiks turning against Al Qaeda and helping the US. This is an excellent article by a Colonel in the US Army that talks about why that came to be and how it may bode well for the future, and why it may not. It seems to be a pretty thoughtful piece that tells it like it is, not necessarily how we want it to be. If you read the whole article, there are also some well written comments at the bottom, and not everyone agrees with the assessment by the Colonel. I will say that my current boss, who spent many years in Saudi Arabia and also had many more years of dealing with the Saudis, and also did his masters work in foreign policy, and who I think understands that region better than most, agrees with this assessment as well. Would be interested to hear from Steve Hawley and Pocketkings on their feelings towards Col. Kilcullen and how they see the progress being made in Anbar province, especially with regards to flipping the Sunni tribes to our side.
Its also interesting to note that while the GAO is painting a bleak picture of the national government and the so-called “benchmarks”, we seem to be doing better on the local level, which is where most insurgencies are won.
Did you actually read the article, or did you just decide to nitpick some words that I put down? OK, they are benchmarks, but maybe, just maybe we are “benchmarking” the wrong things…
I don’t know why Matt and company don’t buy into this. A successful change in strategy simply proves all along that Bush followed failed policies for a time.
I don’t know why Matt and company don’t buy into this. A successful change in strategy simply proves all along that Bush followed failed policies for a time.
I don;t buy into it because as I’ve stated all along, this is an illigitimate war and “winning” and “losing” are therefore irrelevant terms. The only term that has any meaning is “leaving”.
I am not so sure about the flipping of Sunni Tribes (and some Shi’i) to “our” side—but it is nice the hear that the folks who tried to blow up my truck twice are now cooperating with IA/CF if even for their own (tribal) agenda. I read SWJ regularly as well as others on both the Hi and Lo side. Kilkullen is brilliant and well known to all in the community—also know Gentile and Bateman too. Would that we had embarked on our current strategy a year or more sooner, but it is what it is. It’s very interesting to me how much of K’s commentary, analysis and explanation rely on what is basically cultural anthropology. Working with my IA in Salah-ad-Din province I very quickly became aware that virtually every issue and problem we encountered got worked through tribal channels by my IA leadership. Spent many days much bad tea and ill-cooked lamb delving down into this with my IA colonel… I think it’s an honest and very accurate picture by someone who’s in a position to know. K points out very forthrightly that the progress and potential for success is coming from an unanticipated direction; but the potential is there if we can sustain it while preparing mitigation measures to keep it from running off the tracks and making things even more difficult. Given the treasure we’ve spent on this effort I hope he is right. However stability along tribal lines will certainly NOT yield anything approaching a beacon of democracy in the land between the two rivers. It’s more likely to yield a federation of tribal run states; and maybe that’s the best we can achieve from the point we’re at now?
You know, I can’t believe I was stupid enough to think that you folks would actually read an article that provokes some thoughtful discussion, and maybe challenge some assumptions. Did you read the article??!! What the article says is that while we are not meeting the benchmarks for the national government, perhaps we are making enough headway with the tribes that we can succeed along the local level. If you know anything about insurgencies, that may give you cause for some hope.
Spot
Edited to delete some of the initial pissed-offedness…
Thanks for the insight. I think what you are saying tracks pretty well with Kilcullen’s view…its not a done deal, it ain’t never gonna be a democracy, but it can potentially be stable, which is probably the best we can hope for.
As I was reading this article, and noting that the tribes weren’t too keen on the version of Islam that AQ was preaching, I thought about what some observers have said, in that this is not necessarily just a US war against terrorism, but the start of an Islamic Reformation, similar to the upheaval that Christianity went through.
One last time…did you actually read the article?
one final time, wether I read it or not is irrelevant…but to humor you, yes I did read it and the very well written rebuttal by 'Gian P Gentile"
As I noted to Steve, I agree with the author…the best case I think we can hope for is a stable Iraq, not a democratic one. And that’s not necessarily a done deal…
You know Matt, I’ll bet you look in the mirror and see someone you think is very open minded, yet I have to say that of all the people I’ve had discourse with on this forum, you are by far the most closed minded person I have ever traded posts with. You absolutely, steadfastly refuse to consider that you just might be wrong or not know everything there is to know about a situation, and you further complicate matters by viewing everything through a partisan lens.
That article was not about a stunning success at turning Iraq into a democracy, but a much more realistic goal of a stable Iraq. And if you bothered to read the other comments, and not just the one you happened to agree with, you will note that other folks rebutted his rebuttal fairly nicely.
What, specifically, did you find that you disagree with in the article?
Thanks for the article. It was an interesting read. Just some questions and comments.
First, based on this reading, one would almost need to agree with Art that years worth of “stay the course” was a stupid political mantra.
Could someone re-explain the relation between the AQ we understand and the AQI that Kilcullen. Many of the reports note that a small portion of the violence against U.S. troops was AQ orchestrated. But the author here makes it seem like most of the violence is driven by AQI. I’m confused about that.
As for getting better or worse, I think he focused almost exclusively on the one provice, which many people have already recognized as having gotten better. Ironically, it would appear, and I think he states this, that the improvement had little or nothing to do with our presence, but with the locals getting fed up. Part of getting fed up is because AQI doesn’t understand or respect their culture (HELLO!).
Kilcullen notes that a key reason for the locals turning on AQI is that they recognized that we won’t be there forever. Now, in the past, one political party has attacked those who say we should set a date for getting out because it would tell the terrorists to lay low until we leave. But it looks like the message is actually given to the local Iraqis so that they know they must take over.
And finally, I may have missed the conclusion, but he described how the religious leaders pre-war have left the country and the younger generation is trying to consolidate power. What happens when we leave and the old leaders try to come back and re-assert their own power?
Again, interesting article. One more to throw into the hopper.
First, based on this reading, one would almost need to agree with Art that years worth of “stay the course” was a stupid political mantra. Don’t disagree…I think its pretty obvious that an immediate course correction was required as soon as we realized that a full-on insurgency was in the offing in the fall of 2003.
Could someone re-explain the relation between the AQ we understand and the AQI that Kilcullen. Many of the reports note that a small portion of the violence against U.S. troops was AQ orchestrated. But the author here makes it seem like most of the violence is driven by AQI. I’m confused about that.
As for getting better or worse, I think he focused almost exclusively on the one provice, which many people have already recognized as having gotten better. Ironically, it would appear, and I think he states this, that the improvement had little or nothing to do with our presence, but with the locals getting fed up. Part of getting fed up is because AQI doesn’t understand or respect their culture (HELLO!). Actually, Kilcullen notes that since much of Baghdad has ties to the countryside, the tribal factor is beginning to help there as well. But I agree…the way the article reads, the progress has resulted in the tribes having had enough, not necessarily because of us…
Kilcullen notes that a key reason for the locals turning on AQI is that they recognized that we won’t be there forever. **I didn’t get that from the article. It seemed to me that the main reason that the tribes turned against AQI is the brutality with which they acted, their lack of knowledge of the tribes, and their very narrow vision of Islam. **Now, in the past, one political party has attacked those who say we should set a date for getting out because it would tell the terrorists to lay low until we leave. But it looks like the message is actually given to the local Iraqis so that they know they must take over.
And finally, I may have missed the conclusion, but he described how the religious leaders pre-war have left the country and the younger generation is trying to consolidate power. What happens when we leave and the old leaders try to come back and re-assert their own power? Not religious leades, but tribal leaders. Kilcullen points out that one of the reasons the younger generation may cooperate with the national government is to consolidate their power in that event.
And finally, I may have missed the conclusion, but he described how the religious leaders pre-war have left the country and the younger generation is trying to consolidate power. What happens when we leave and the old leaders try to come back and re-assert their own power? Not religious leades, but tribal leaders. Kilcullen points out that one of the reasons the younger generation may cooperate with the national government is to consolidate their power in that event. __________________________
Ah, you’re correct. I meant tribal leaders, not religious ones. Although, in many cases these are the same people. So, once the older guys come back and want their power there is going to be a real struggle.
Very possibly, although I will admit to not knowing what the liklihood of that is, if the younger guys have truly consolidated their position, nor what the tribal “etiquette” of that situation is…
Truly a complex society, and I will also admit that I had forgotten about the tribal element when thinking about what was going on over there.
I don’t know why Matt and company don’t buy into this. A successful change in strategy simply proves all along that Bush followed failed policies for a time.
Art–Maybe its time to rethink your position–do you like the company you are in?
Katie Couric is on board–
"(CBS)BAGHDAD, Iraq One week before Gen. David Petraeus is expected to give his report on U.S. progress in Iraq, CBS Evening News anchor Katie Couric says she has already seen dramatic improvements in the country.
“We hear so much about things going bad, but real progress has been made there in terms of security and stability,” Couric said Tuesday. “I mean, obviously, infrastructure problems abound, but Sunnis and U.S. forces are working together. They banded together because they had a common enemy: al Qaeda.” http://wcbstv.com/topstories/local_story_247203227.html
And Hillary–We’ve begun to change tactics in Iraq, and in some areas, particularly in Al Anbar province, it’s working.