Flooding in Texas youth camps

So you understand the difference between a warning and a watch? They’re very different. Watches you can be cognizant of but tune out. A warning you should pay attention to IMO.

This

This

When TF did the three reply limit get removed? I like it.

It doesn’t apply to threads you start

Ahh. Learning new stuff every day.

It’s very easy to be all knowledgeable after events have unfolded. Humans make mistakes all the time. Sometimes they are through ignorance. Sometimes they refuse to believe the risks. Other times they are just risk takers. People die as a consequence.

I can see circumstances where the risks here may not have been appropriately realised by the responsible adults:

  • Historical flood levels not having reached those that arrived during the early hours of the morning.
  • New staff unfamiliar with those historical flood levels, seeing the river well below the banks as night fell the day before. Note that the 1987 flooding was some 40 years ago. Responsible adults exposed to that event are likely long past being involved and having the hindsight to act.
  • Flood maps in the area are out of date and have not taken into consideration more recent rain gauge data or factored in climate change impacts.
  • Texas inspectors having reviewed and approved the risk management plans some two-days prior.

If people here want to accuse adults of incompetence, then direct it at the authorities. The camp was built in 1926, long before flood levels and advanced modelling became available. It wasn’t just plonked down in the middle of a known floodplain.

A lot of self-righteous comments going on here. Statistics suggest that it’s more likely than not such people have also partaken in risky behavior that has put other people’s lives in danger, such as touching a phone whilst driving, driving tired, driving under the influence, provided critical care to others whilst fatigued. “Let he who is without sin…”

The adults at ground zero who survived will live with the guilt the rest of their lives.

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Please provide citations to the first point (as best as I can tell this was not a historic high)

As to point two the owners have owned it for multiple generations and the camp director was 70 …want to do the math there? Also please see the news story video above that discusses the repeated flooding of the camp.

Point three I don’t see the relevance

Point four please describe what they approved (hint you may be surprised)

Nothing in your post takes into account not having a warning system of any kind for flash floods or putting the youngest aka weakest kids closest to the river.

As to driving tired etc. that’s a whopper of a list of red herrings.

And the kids they let down won’t

Discussion of warnings

BULLETIN - EAS ACTIVATION REQUESTED Flash Flood Warning National Weather Service Austin/San Antonio TX 114 AM CDT Fri Jul 4 2025 The National Weather Service in Austin/San Antonio has issued a * Flash Flood Warning for… Northwestern Bandera County in south central Texas… Central Kerr County in south central Texas… * Until 415 AM CDT. * At 114 AM CDT, Doppler radar indicated thunderstorms producing heavy rain across the warned area. Between 1 and 2 inches of rain have fallen. The expected rainfall rate is 2 to 3 inches in 1 hour. Additional rainfall amounts of 1 to 3 inches are possible in the warned area. Flash flooding is ongoing or expected to begin shortly. HAZARD…Life threatening flash flooding. Thunderstorms producing flash flooding. SOURCE…Radar. IMPACT…Life threatening flash flooding of creeks and streams, urban areas, highways, streets and underpasses. * Some locations that will experience flash flooding include… Kerrville, Ingram, Hunt, Waltonia, Kerr Wildlife Management Area and Lost Maples State Natural Area. PRECAUTIONARY/PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS… Turn around, don’t drown when encountering flooded roads. Most flood deaths occur in vehicles. Be especially cautious at night when it is harder to recognize the dangers of flooding. In hilly terrain there are hundreds of low water crossings which are potentially dangerous in heavy rain. Do not attempt to cross flooded roads. Find an alternate route. && LAT…LON 3013 9949 3013 9918 2990 9919 2990 9926 2981 9931 2982 9960 3001 9959 FLASH FLOOD…RADAR INDICATED FLASH FLOOD DAMAGE THREAT…CONSIDERABLE EXPECTED RAINFALL RATE…2-3 INCHES IN 1 HOUR

If people want to dispute knowing this three hours earlier wouldn’t make a difference so be it

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I’ve seen that mentioned a few times too.

However, it’s one thing to have plans approved. It’s more important to actually follow through on plans when necessary.

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https://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/camp-mystic-where-deadly-texas-flooding-took-place-is-in-flash-flood-alley/1791962#:~:text=The%20river%20gauge%20on%20the,deadly%20flooding%20is%20not%20uncommon.
image

So at 70 years old, he was not alive at the time of the 1932 flood, which was the previous max according to point 1. Or is my math wrong there?

I’ve seen it written in a few articles (Texas inspectors approved Camp Mystic’s disaster plan 2 days before deadly flood, records show – Houston Public Media) that ‘flooding’ occurs at around 3m high. Flooding can be as benign as lapping onto a footpath down adjacent the river. The same article goes on to say that “At that location, a river level of 32 feet (9.75 meters) could lead to "disastrous life-threatening flooding,” which could cover the roads of the lowest camps and resorts, according to NOAA." So there is a huge range between where ‘flooding’ occurs, and where life threatening flooding occurs, per reports. Point being that ‘repeat flooding’ tells us very little in this case.
Point 3 is a generic point to highlight that historical maximums are more likely to be exceeded because climate change is creating more intense bursts of rain. Camp owners (not necessarily just this one but others globally) could be given a false sense of security thinking some areas are in safe zones per mapping. I did state that I could see situations where people don’t fully appreciate risks (though I did say ‘here’, I intended to be generic).

Did the inspectors raise concerns that they did not have alarms, the way you and others are inferring it was gross negligence not to have them? It doesn’t sound like it, but I have only seen 1-2 articles. These are the people who should be making the most noise, not the armchair quarterbacks who have all the answers in the aftermath. It was two days out from the storm. They would have known as well as anyone that something potentially big was brewing. Were warnings given?

I don’t see your point about youngest and weakest kids being in the closest hut, given people of all ages died here. It had nothing to do with swimming ability.

Certainly, I agree with your point that having had alarms installed could likely have made all the difference. Hopefully it brings about real change where such systems become compulsory.

But I disagree with the comments here claiming this was foreseeable and totally preventable. Historical maximum floods were not forecast earlier in the evening. The experts didn’t see it coming.

No one appears to know what these plans actually covered.

At what point do you evacuate? What have other, released plans stated as their course of action? It is unrealistic to expect that every public facility along a river bank fully understands weather forecasts and how they translate to flood levels. It is reasonable to expect that experts provide warnings, much like police or the fire brigade do when a bush fire approaches.

Yes, not publicly released as far as I know.

But at a bare minimum, I assume plans would have stipulated 1) capabilities for receiving alerts and warnings; 2) procedures and processes to act on them.

Second point is where the questions abound.

IMO that’s the tragic misstep.

One camp along the river did evacuate and no one from that camp died. I don’t understand how you can argue the “reasonableness” of a camp deciding to evacuate when we have an example of one that did.

Your argument would carry alot more weight if everyone suffered the same fate, however that is not the case.

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AI summary from 1987 flood. Evacuation has it’s own risks.

On July 17th, 1987, the Guadalupe River, swelled by overnight storms, began to rise rapidly. Law enforcement officials notified the church camp, located near the river, to evacuate and avoid crossing the flooded river.
A decision was made to evacuate the children early. A caravan of buses and a van left the camp around 7:45 AM, encountering a low water crossing on the Guadalupe River that was already flooded. The lead vehicles successfully turned around, but the last bus stalled and a van behind it became stranded due to the rising water and backwash from the convoy.
Attempts to evacuate the children from the bus and van were made, but a sudden “wall of water,” estimated to be up to half a mile wide, swept over the campers, scattering them despite their attempts to form a human chain. Ten teenagers drowned.

What does Australia have to do with this?

OK, I see that, the NWS actually issues the forecasts and it’s the info-tainment outlets that put their wrapper around it with bloated headlines and paranoia-inducing graphics often enough that people begin to tune it out.

The experts did provide the warnings. What we are really expecting out of the people running a camp with hundreds of kids under their care is for them to not all go to bed.

There is a pretty good chance this could have been avoided if they drew straws and short straw had to stay up and keep an eye on things. If they had done that people would not have been waking up to the flood already destroying the camp.

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If you have a public facility, especially one that frequently houses children, in a known specific danger area then it is completely realistic to expect the members and workers of that facility to fully understand the known threats and their causes and their alerts and then have plans laid out, practiced, and implemented.

The owner of the camp and their managers and insurance company should have this sorted out from day one and have regular reviews and drills so that there is no doubt that nothing but full effort and diligence was given.

If you are in a known avalanche area then you should be fully prepped for the warnings and conditions that cause them and the necessary drills to keep persons safe. If you are in a known tornado area, same logic applies. If you are in a known fire area and conditions are right same logic applies. If you are in a public facility there must be proper detectors and alarms and drills.

No one forced this camp to exist there. But it IS a known flood area and HAS flooded in the past.

Flash floods are not a new phenomenon. There really is no excuse for poor planning and execution.

To say it is unrealistic for the owners of a children’s camp in a known flood area to “fully understand weather forecasts” is unacceptable. It is the bare minimum.

Tornados can pop up without warning. The storm surge may have risen to unspeakable levels in 45 minutes but the storm was known and warnings were issued.

The beginning of camp and or the night before:
Adults should be on night watch shifts, every bunk operator should have been warned, emergency evacuation procedures reviewed, and there should be adequate, fast/easy, and loud communication between bunks. Start evacuating the bunks closets to the river first and work your way back.

As windy said, a $100 radio manned by one person at all times and some walkie talkies, then a solid and practiced procedure.

I can’t keep hearing “do you know how many warnings we get that amount to nothing” and not have my jaw drop.

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