From the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, Conlusion No. 95--"The CIA's assessment on safe haven--that al Qaeda or associated operatives were present in Baghdad and in northeastern Iraq...was reasonable."
"Interesting that you ommitted "in an area under Kurdish control " in that quote. Could it be that you were trying to be intentionally misleading?"
Nope--not really pertinent. They were in Iraq and developing that area of the country into a safe haven--with or without tacit or active support from Hussein. As I pointed out, safe haven is something you cannot allow an insurgency or guerrilla force to maintain access to.
"You also left out these:
(U) Conclusion 93. The Central Intelligence Agency reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.
(U) Conclusion 96. The Central Intelligence Agency's assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise.
(U) Conclusion 99. Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al-Qaida."
Again, not pertinent to the argument I am making vis-a-vis safe haven. If we are going to deny al Qaeda safe haven, and the country in which the safe haven exists will not cooperate or allow us to otherwise assist them in eliminating that safe haven, then as a last resort, military operations must be undertaken.
"Interesting that you ommitted "in an area under Kurdish control " in that quote. Could it be that you were trying to be intentionally misleading?"
Nope--not really pertinent. They were in Iraq and developing that area of the country into a safe haven--with or without tacit or active support from Hussein. As I pointed out, safe haven is something you cannot allow an insurgency or guerrilla force to maintain access to.
"You also left out these:
(U) Conclusion 93. The Central Intelligence Agency reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not add up to an established formal relationship.
(U) Conclusion 96. The Central Intelligence Agency's assessment that to date there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al-Qaida attack was reasonable and objective. No additional information has emerged to suggest otherwise.
(U) Conclusion 99. Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al-Qaida."
Again, not pertinent to the argument I am making vis-a-vis safe haven. If we are going to deny al Qaeda safe haven, and the country in which the safe haven exists will not cooperate or allow us to otherwise assist them in eliminating that safe haven, then as a last resort, military operations must be undertaken.