"basically the USA will bail us out so no need to worry."
i get the frustration over nato. but here's a little history which i'm sure you know. when germany's troops marched over the bridges in 1936 even a token pushback would have stopped the remilitarization of the rhineland. when germany invaded the sudetenland and jodl took a look at the czech defenses, he realized then germany could not have succeeded had their been any pushback.
we had a foreign policy prior to 1941 that was non-interventionist, even isolationist. we had that in 1916 as well. the question of when to intervene is not easy. we've probably been too interventionist over the last 15 years. but when you know you're going to intervene anyway, eventually, as would be the case in western europe, we have made the calculation post-WWII that we may as well make it easier for ourselves and draw a line in the sand, draw it early, draw it as far out as we can.
trump sees our alliances as business propositions. mercenary deals. you pay us, we defend you. others see this as, we have a presence in a location very strategic to us, in japan, in korea, in the philippines, in bahrain, in germany and - guess what! - those countries are paying half or more of our costs!
it's a legitimate geopolitical debate, how much of a presence we ought to have. where should we express our presence. we were pretty darned unhappy when russia expressed its presence in cuba. we saw that as a strategic thorn in our side. likewise, having the baltics in nato is a thorn in russia's side. but like 1936, 1938, the berlin airlift in 1948, if you make the decision to draw that line in the sand then i don't think you want to waffle on that. no one will know how many american and european lives and treasure have been saved by drawing that firm line in the sand with nato, but it's abundantly clear that russian and chinese hegemonies in europe and western asia are the goal if nobody puts up the stop sign.
Dan Empfield
aka Slowman
i get the frustration over nato. but here's a little history which i'm sure you know. when germany's troops marched over the bridges in 1936 even a token pushback would have stopped the remilitarization of the rhineland. when germany invaded the sudetenland and jodl took a look at the czech defenses, he realized then germany could not have succeeded had their been any pushback.
we had a foreign policy prior to 1941 that was non-interventionist, even isolationist. we had that in 1916 as well. the question of when to intervene is not easy. we've probably been too interventionist over the last 15 years. but when you know you're going to intervene anyway, eventually, as would be the case in western europe, we have made the calculation post-WWII that we may as well make it easier for ourselves and draw a line in the sand, draw it early, draw it as far out as we can.
trump sees our alliances as business propositions. mercenary deals. you pay us, we defend you. others see this as, we have a presence in a location very strategic to us, in japan, in korea, in the philippines, in bahrain, in germany and - guess what! - those countries are paying half or more of our costs!
it's a legitimate geopolitical debate, how much of a presence we ought to have. where should we express our presence. we were pretty darned unhappy when russia expressed its presence in cuba. we saw that as a strategic thorn in our side. likewise, having the baltics in nato is a thorn in russia's side. but like 1936, 1938, the berlin airlift in 1948, if you make the decision to draw that line in the sand then i don't think you want to waffle on that. no one will know how many american and european lives and treasure have been saved by drawing that firm line in the sand with nato, but it's abundantly clear that russian and chinese hegemonies in europe and western asia are the goal if nobody puts up the stop sign.
Dan Empfield
aka Slowman